## 1NC

### 1NC – Kritik

#### Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism**, then, **is** less of a theory and more of **a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates.** Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.** If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are ~~hobbled~~ [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called **allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left**—think Bernie Sanders—**because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption**. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. **I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism**. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that **redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.”** The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, **the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern** (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) **is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption**. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? **How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?** Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?

#### (Maybe not) Attempts at changing urban agricultural practice simply recreate the same hierarchies they attempt to dismantle. The 1AC will always recreate new and worse forms of gentrification while also demonizing projects of black and native foodways that have already begun the work.

**McClintock 18** [Nathan McClintock, Professor at Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, May 22, 2018, “Urban agriculture, racial capitalism, and resistance in the settler-colonial city”, Wiley Online Library, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gec3.12373?casa_token=v-oWijW4HMgAAAAA%3AuCrVmoalxNdvNZ7QhGTAKebNuh5nBESgnZ91qHVKn6zoOZeBi-sbGJRS6ZUgu4xhlQs6AK_yJRcbACUU>, JMH]

Scholarship on contemporary Urban Agriculture (UA) projects reveals similar logics of Othering and civilizing at play in North American cities. Critical food scholars have written extensively on the ways in which alternative food initiatives ultimately support neoliberal capitalism (Alkon & Mares, 2012; Guthman, 2008c; Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; Weissman, 2015), arguing, for example, that organized UA efforts can contribute to neoliberal subject formation by shifting responsibility to the individual and away from collective mobilization against the corporate agri-food system (McClintock, 2014; Pudup, 2008). But the formation of the ideal neoliberal “foodie” also mobilizes a highly normative set of imaginaries and claims, many of which undergird racial-capitalist and settler logics of Othering. Many UA efforts draw on an agrarian romanticization of “going back to the land” and “getting your hands dirty,” while remaining blind to racialized and gendered histories of agricultural exploitation (Carlisle, 2014; Guthman, 2008a, 2008b; Rotz, 2017) and eliding questions of whose land they are actually “going back to.” These studies have also revealed how UA can reinforce hegemonic racial hierarchies, where well-meaning UA advocates intent on “bringing good food to others” (Guthman, 2008a) can re-inscribe paternalistic power asymmetries and colonial patterns of oppression of people of color (Lyson, 2014; Ramírez, 2015; Reynolds & Cohen, 2016; Rosan & Pearsall, 2017). Discourses of purity, mobilized in opposition to corporate, processed food, can also denigrate Indigenous and non-White foodways (Alkon et al., 2013; DeLind, 2010; Minkoff-Zern, 2014). Furthermore, the Whiteness of alternative food initiatives—and their capacity for racial Othering—is spatialized through what Saldanha (2007, p. 50) refers to as “viscosity,” or the tendency of “white bodies to stick and exclude others.” Several scholars have described how such viscosity has rendered alternative food spaces as White spaces (Alkon & McCullen, 2011; Slocum, 2007), where community gardens, for example, become exclusionary, despite their presumed ability to bring a diversity of people together (Bosco & Joassart-Marcelli, 2017; Drake, 2014). As White people begin to dominate agricultural spaces in older communities of color, the actual practice of UA can result in territorial appropriation. Even well-intentioned activists working under a banner of “food justice” or “reclaiming the commons” can unintentionally contribute to dispossession and displacement of people of color (McClintock, 2018; Stehlin & Tarr, 2017). Indeed, UA efforts by White people are often perceived as colonial by those they intend to “help.” Meenar and Hoover (2016, p. 10) quote an African American gardener who describes the urban farming efforts in a low-income area of Philadelphia as “a white, top down activity.” Similarly, Owens and Antiporda (2017, p. 165) describe how garden project failed in its efforts to fulfill a promise to construct “a garden on every corner” in historically Black West Oakland precisely because it “replicated the colonial ‘ideology’ of ‘improvement’ and risked appearing obtuse to the reality of displacement in the context of extreme gentrification.” Discussing a White-led garden project in Seattle, Ramírez (2015) notes a similar blindness to power asymmetries, as do Rosan and Pearsall (2017) in their study of UA in Philadelphia, exemplifying the “disavowal of the processes of dispossession” (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, & Corntassel, 2014, p. 5) fundamental to the racial formation of White settlers (Rotz, 2017). **But even while many White urban farmers are actually sensitive to uneven power dynamics, their efforts often overshadow the existing UA efforts of non-White community residents. This has material impacts, as municipalities and funders alike tend to privilege large-scale, photogenic UA, thereby disproportionately shifting land, equipment, and grant funding away from organizations of color to these new urban farmers** (Horst, McClintock, & Hoey, 2017; Reynolds & Cohen, 2016). Indeed, it is in such gentrifying neighborhoods that UA seems most visibly entangled in racial-capitalist/settler-colonial logics of Othering and dispossession. Clamoring to take advantage of the growing “rent gap” between actual and potential property values in disinvested neighborhoods of color, developers, landlords, and gentrifiers alike invoke a frontier imaginary that appeals to “pioneers” and “urban homesteaders” in search of cheap housing (N. Smith, 1996). Harkening back to the westward settlement of the United States by Whites granted “free” land under a series of Homestead Acts, such discourse reframes devalued inner-city neighborhoods as uncharted “urbs nullius” (Coulthard, 2014, p. 176), rendering “the present innercity population as a natural element of their physical surroundings” (Smith, 1996, p. xvi), while “evading Indigenous sovereignty and the modern presence of actual urban Native peoples” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 28; see also Jackson, 2009). In some cases, commercial developers and market gardeners, trumpeting promises of enhanced food security or sustainability, purchase or lease vast tracts of vacant land at fire sale prices in these neighborhoods, acquisitions that locals see as “land grabs” that do little more than enrich the owner at the community's expense (Paddeu, 2017; Safransky, 2017). Several authors have described this phenomenon in Detroit and other post-industrial cities where vacant land is abundant. But similar processes are visible everywhere, arising where land values are lower and—given the racialized nature of uneven development—where populations of color tend to be concentrated (Lederman, 2017; Pothukuchi, 2017; Rosan & Pearsall, 2017). Urban agriculture is caught up in racial-capitalist and settler logics of urban development precisely because it distinguishes “new development, rising home values, and a whiter residential population” from a neighborhood's “racially marginalized past” (Dillon, 2014, p. 1211), or as Pettygrove and Ghose (2018, p. 601) put it, UA works “to racialize revitalization as whiteness, in that it is a process meant to improve neighborhoods understood to be black.” Even if longtime residents tend gardens, the viscosity and visibility of White gardeners—growing food UA in their yards, community garden plots, or vacant lots—serves as a signal to future gentrifiers and investors that the neighborhood is on the road to being livable and green (McClintock, 2018**). Urban agriculture, like other green amenities, is thus performative and often most widespread in some of the trendiest neighborhoods** (Lebowitz & Trudeau, 2017; Lowell & Law, 2017; McClintock, Mahmoudi, Simpson, & Santos, 2016; Naylor, 2012; Quastel, 2009). As demonstrated above, UA has been entangled in processes of racial Othering and dispossession central to the racial-capitalist development of settler cities. But as noted in the introduction, UA can work in contradictory ways. In the next section, I draw on insights from Black geographies and Indigenous studies to illustrate how UA's emancipatory functions arise dialectically in response to the logics and material outcomes of settler colonialism and racial capitalism. Many scholars have raised that alarm that a narrow focus on political economic structures, particularly those grounded in Marxian critiques of neoliberal capitalism, can foreclose alternative, anti-capitalist pathways (Gibson-Graham, 2006; Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Springer, 2014). Scholars of Black geographies have further warned of the scholarly erasure of Black epistemologies, ontologies, and material practices. Even when well-intentioned, a narrow focus on racial violence can reinforce racist differentiation by essentializing the Black experience as tantamount to death and dying, thereby reinforcing the role that “scenes of subjection” (Hartman, 1997) have historically played in normalizing violence against Black bodies and Othering Black spaces (Gilmore, 2002; Mbembe, 2003; McKittrick, 2013; Woods, 2002). Instead, these authors argue for a dialectical approach to understanding Black space that also includes the social movements that emerge in opposition to racial capitalism's assault on Black life. McKittrick (2011, p. 955), for example, asserts that Black geographies “hold in them useful anti-colonial practices and narratives” and “are not just about limitations, captivities, and erasures; they are also about everyday contestations, philosophical demands, and the possibilities the production of space can engender for subaltern subjects” (McKittrick, 2006, p. 121). Mirroring Robinson's dialectical understanding of the emergence of the Black radical tradition as a movement to reconstitute social bonds torn apart by racial capitalism (Melamed, 2015, p. 80; Robinson, 2000), Woods identifies a “Blues model of sustainable development” that arises in dialectical opposition to slavery and Jim Crow oppression (Woods, 2000, 2017). Similarly, critics have warned that studies of settler colonialism risk perpetuating the dominance of a singular colonial narrative that can silence Indigenous theorizing, thus reinforcing settler-colonial logics of erasure (Hugill, 2017). Rather than focusing solely on settler structures of oppression, Indigenous scholars have stressed the importance of examining everyday practices and other assertions of the multiple sovereignties that work in opposition to settler logics (Corntassel, 2012; Daigle, 2017; Simpson, 2014). To this end, the theory and praxis of Indigenous resurgence entails “recommitments and reorientations” to Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and practices (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p. 611). Action at the scale of the individual and household may scale up over time into social or political movements challenging the authority and territorial claims of the settler-colonial state (Daigle, 2017).

#### Slavery morphs and recodes itself in different ways- it relies on the sadism of liberal progress narratives to perfect itself and maintain “life”. Only the alternative can disrupt this project and render these promises incoherent.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 94-96, JMH]

Northup’s book implies, without stating directly, why this generalization of sadism—brutality as the constituent element of family bonding—cannot be understood as being triggered by transgressions. It is as ubiquitous as the air he breathes. “It was rarely a day passed without more whippings . . . It is the literal, unvarnished truth, that the crack of the lash and the shrieking of slaves, can be heard from dark till bedtime . . .” Patsey and Solomon, unlike Stella and me, were living in a place and time when civil society and the Human were neither ashamed nor embarrassed by this. A thousand miles upriver and one hundred twenty six years later, Josephine was shocked by this inheritance, but it didn’t take her long to recover, and to claim it. Though the structure of Stella’s “life” (or, better, **the paradigm of social death**, for the quotation marks are essential here) **cannot be reconciled with the** structure of Josephine’s life (or **the paradigm of social life**), there is a connection. But **this connection is parasitic and perverse—regardless of what the socially dead Black person (i.e., Stella and Patsey) or the socially alive Human (i.e., Josephine or Mary Epps) might say about their “relationship.”** It is parasitic because White and non-Black subjectivity cannot be imbued with the capacity for selfknowledge and intersubjective community without anti-Black violence; without, that is, the violence of social death. In other words, **White people and their junior partners need anti-Black violence to know they’re alive.\*** If Hattie McDaniel were to truly die, as Stella proclaimed, it would be tantamount to the death of a parasite’s host. This is what makes social death something more surreal than the end of breath. It is, in the words of David Marriott, a deathliness that saturates life, not an embalming; a resource for Human renewal. **It is perverse for many reasons: one of which is the fact that as civil society matures** (from 1853 to December 1979, when it all went south with Josephine)—and we move historically from the obvious technologies of chattel slavery to universal suffrage, the discourse of human rights, and the concept of universal access to civil society— the anti-Black violence necessary for the elaboration and maintenance of White (and non-Black) subjectivity gets repressed and becomes increasingly unavailable to conscious (as opposed to unconscious) speech. (“I judge people by the quality of their character,” as Dr. King said, “and not the color of their skin”; or the commonly spoken, “At the end of the day, we’re all Americans and we’re in this together”— and other such malarkey of the conscious mind.) But the pageantries of naked and submissive Black flesh, pageantries of bleeding backs and buttocks, whip marks, amputations, and faces closed by horse bits, provide evidence of the role sadism plays in the constitution of White subjectivity, and *12 Years a Slave* makes this visible on the screen, despite its repression in the narrative of both the film and civil society writ large. It is tempting and commonplace to reduce Mary and Edwin Epps’s sadism to individual psychopathology. Or one might think that Edwin Epps is one of a group of exceptionally sadistic people who lived in an exceptionally sadistic time and place. But the film, and to an even greater extent the autobiography, sees (rather than narrates) sadism—the sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by inflicting physical or mental pain on a love object—not as the individual pathology of a handful of people, but as a generalized condition; generalized in that pleasure, as a constituent element of communal life, cannot be disentangled from anti-Black violence. Conventionally, **the object of sadism can**, tomorrow, **become the subject of sadism**. But the sadism that constitutes the spectacles of *12 Years a Slave*, and which constitutes early nineteenth century society, is not imbued with such reciprocity. The Slaves of social death cannot switch places and make Edwin Epps or his equally cruel wife the love objects of their collective sadism. If they did so in private (if Patsey beat Edwin or Mary in a private bedroom encounter, for example) **it is because such a reversal was occasioned and allowed—in other words, the master used his prerogative and power to play a different game, one in which he suffers because suffering fulfills his fantasy and because, unlike the Slave, his fantasies have “objective value.”** Such role reversals do not imbue the encounter with reciprocity. **The changes that begin to occur after the Civil War and up through the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and the American election of a Black president are merely changes in the weather. Despite the fact that the sadism is no longer played out in the open as it was in l840, nothing essential has changed.**

#### Their aims to incorporate socially dead bodies within state-centric frameworks but ignores that the state is exactly why they are helpless. The 1AC performs an act of pornotroping from which they derive entertainment from saving those they are responsible for subjugating

Weheliye (Alexander G., professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University) 2014 (Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, Duke University Press, pg. 90-91 C.A.)

Spillers has referred to the enactment of black suffering for a shocked and titillated audience as “pornotroping”: “This profound intimacy of in- terlocking detail is disrupted, however, by externally imposed meanings and uses: (1) the captive body as the source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality; (2) at the same time—in stunning contradiction—it is reduced to a thing, to being for the captor; (3) in this distance from a subject posi- tion, the captured sexualities provide a physical and biological expression of ‘otherness’; (4) as a category of ‘otherness,’ the captive body translates into a potential for pornotroping and embodies sheer physical powerless- ness that slides into a more general ‘powerlessness’” (“Mama’s Baby,” 206). Spillers directs our seeing to several facets of the body/flesh, human/not- quite-human, sovereign/bare life, and so on pas des deux in her insistence on the simultaneous thingness and sensuality of the slave, which lays bare the extralegal components of this volatile Ding. Pornotroping unconceals the literally bare, naked, and denuded dimensions of bare life, underscor- ing how political domination frequently produces a sexual dimension that cannot be controlled by the forces that (re)produce it. As Daphne Brooks remarks, “born out of diasporic plight and subject to pornotroping,” black flesh has “countenanced a ‘powerful stillness.’”5 The hieroglyphics of the flesh, embodied here by pornotroping, circumnavigate the connubial abyss of subjection and freedom, displaying at once the physical powerlessness of the dysselected slave subject and the untainted power of the selected mas- ter subject. In order to better follow Spillers’s brilliant coarticulation of porno and trope, a brief etymological detour is in order. Originally porno signified “pros- titute” and in the ancient Greek context whence it sprang, the term referred to female slaves that were sold expressly for prostitution. Also a derivation from Greek, trope, according to Hayden White, refers to “turn” and “way” or “manner”; later, by way of Latin, trope is aligned with “figure of speech.” White states the following of the palimpsestic structure of this word: “Tropes are deviations from literal, conventional, or ‘proper’ language use. . . . It is not only a deviation from one possible, proper, meaning, but also a de- viation towards another meaning.”6 In pornotroping, the double rotation White identifies at the heart of the trope figures the remainder of law and violence linguistically, staging the simultaneous sexualization and brutaliza- tion of the (female) slave, yet—and this marks its complexity—it remains unclear whether the turn or deviation is toward violence or sexuality.7 90 Chapter Six Pornotroping, then, names the becoming-flesh of the (black) body and forms a primary component in the processes by which human beings are converted into bare life. In the words of Saidiya Hartman, it marks “the means by which the wanton use of and the violence directed towards the black body come to be identified as its pleasure and dangers—that is, the expectations of slave property are ontologized as the innate capacities and inner feelings of the enslaved, and moreover, the ascription of excess and enjoyment to the African effaces the violence perpetrated against the enslaved.”8 The violence inflicted upon the enslaved body becomes syn- onymous with the projected surplus pleasure that always already moves in excess of the sovereign subject’s jouissance; pleasure (rapture) and vio- lence (bondage) deviate from and toward each other, setting in motion the historical happening of the slave thing: a potential for pornotroping.9 In Christina Sharpe’s words, the black body and flesh “become the bearers (through violence, regulation, transmission, etc.) of the knowledge of cer- tain subjection as well as the placeholders of freedom for those who would claim freedom as their rightful yield.”10 How does the historical question of violent political domination activate a surplus and excess of sexuality that simultaneously sustains and disfigures said brutality? Or what are the sexual dimensions of objectification in slavery and other forms of extreme political and social domination? My argument is not about erotics per se but dwells in the juxtaposition of violence as the antithesis of the human(e) (bondage) and “normal” sexuality (rapture) as the apposite property of this figure.11 Once again, I am bracketing questions of agency and resistance, since they obfuscate—and not in a productive way—the textures of enfleshment, that is, the modes of being which outlive the dusk of the law and the dawn of political violence

#### Only through embracement of disorder and incoherence via the alternative are we able create revolutionary politics that disrupt the generative mechanism of civil society.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 249-252, JMH]

Again, though this is a bond between Blacks and Whites (or, more precisely, between Black and non-Blacks), it is produced by a violent intrusion that does not cut both ways. Whereas the phobic bond is an injunction against Black psychic integration and Black filial and affilial relations, it is the lifeblood of White psychic integration and filial (which is to say, domestic) and affilial (or institutional) relations. For whoever says “rape” says Black; whoever says “prison” says Black; and whoever says “AIDS” says Black—the Negro is a phobogenic object: a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. If a social movement is to be neither social democratic nor Marxist, in terms of its structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation of social death embodied in Black beings. **If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the “~~Negro~~” “Black” has been inviting Whites, as well as civil society’s junior partners** (for example, Palestinians, Native Americans, Latinx) **to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps.** They have been, and remain today (even in the most anti-racist movements, like anti-colonial insurgency) invested elsewhere. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. and the world. **This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a program of complete disorder. One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one’s politics are to be underwritten by a revolutionary desire.** What other lines of accountability are there when slaves are in the room? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, Gee whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. Few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness—and the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: Gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain inorgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If, **through this stasis or paralysis, they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (such as the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black: radical politics morphed into extensions of the master’s prerogative.** In this way, **social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between Humans and Slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding-out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding Black people’s frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of “absolute dereliction.” It is a “scandal” that rends civil society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death. But lest we forget, this is not a question of volition. It is not as simple as waking up in the morning and deciding, in one’s conscious mind, to “do the right thing.” **For when we scale up from the terrain of the psyche to the terrain of armed struggle, we may be faced with a situation in which the eradication of the generative mechanism of Black suffering is something that is not in anyone’s interest.** Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is not in the interest of Palestinians and Israelis, as my shocking encounter with my friend Sameer, on a placid hillside, suggests; because his anti-Black phobia mobilizes the fantasy of belonging that the Israeli state might otherwise strip him of. For him to secure his status as a relational being (if only in his unconscious), his unconscious must labor to maintain the Black as a genealogical isolate. “The shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier was an Ethiopian Jew.” The Israelis are killing the Palestinians, literally; but psychic life, Human capacity for relations, is vouchsafed by a libidinal relay between them and their common labor to avoid ~~“niggerization”~~ [~~negroization~~] [racialization]  
(Fanon). **This relay is the generative mechanism that makes life life. It is also the generative mechanism of Black suffering and isolation. The end of this generative mechanism would mean the end of the world. We would find ourselves peering into the abyss.** This trajectory is too iconoclastic for working-class, post-colonial, and/or radical feminist conceptual frameworks. The Human need to be liberated in the world is not the same as the Black need to be liberated from the world; which is why even their most radical cognitive maps draw borders between the living and the dead. Finally**, if we push this analysis to the wall, it becomes clear that eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is also not in the interests of Black revolutionaries. For how can we disimbricate Black juridical and political desire from the Black psyche’s desire to destroy the Black imago, a desire that constitutes the psyche?** In short, bonding with Whites and non-Blacks over phobic reactions to the Black imago provides the Black psyche with the only semblance of psychic integration it is likely to have: the need to destroy a Black imago and love a White ideal. “In these circumstances, having a ‘white’ unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss. The intruding fantasy offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego, but there is also no ‘outside’ to this ‘real fantasy’ and the effects of intrusion are irreparable.” This raises the question, who is the speaking subject of Black insurgent testimony; who bears witness when the Black insurgent takes the stand? Who is writing this book?

### 1NC – Ag

#### Whiteness is an existential threat—

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

#### Their invocation of ecological catastrophe obliterates black life by narratively cohering it within a linear temporality of progress.

--Time—defined as humanity’s experience of temporality—is not “real”, it’s a mental construct designed to help us make sense of difference between memories and now—aff’s narrative of emergency turns truth into fiction bc their evaluative criteria isn’t accuracy in a vacuum, it’s always informed by temporal try-or-die calculations—that obliterates black life by assembling it into white grammars

--alt of embracing crisis is generative

--the link is unique! The aff fractures movements through their narratives—“When the moment for organized challenge emerges, white hegemony rushes to squander the creative energy and reorients social relations toward its consolidation. It does so by rushing to innovate through the co-production of narratives and an emerging ecological order. ”

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Physicists, spiritual leaders, and theorists argue ‘time is not real’ (Martin, 2020; Rovelli, 2018). It is a ‘human construct … to help us differentiate between now and our perception of the past’ (Martin, 2020). As a meaning that human groups have given to change (Tabboni, 2001), it organizes our systems of thought and our everyday lives. Time has special meaning in politics, where ‘the very distinction between truth and fiction has been made redundant’ so that ‘the criterion is no longer accuracy – it’s conformity to the needs of the moment’ (Klein, 2014; emphasis added). Our present analytical and political challenge is to grapple with the ways time is entangled with the ‘needs of the moment’ in areas of energy and climate change. Yet the politics of the ecological require understanding time. Notions like succession, simultaneity, duration, urgency, waiting, speed, geological revolutions, money, and death are expressions of time and are entangled with the ecological and its models of development.

The increasing risks to the environment as a result of the extraction of conventional oil and natural gas resources and the increased greenhouse emissions have led to what the experts have called the climate crisis. Yet as Klein says, ‘despite being convinced of the necessity of addressing our behavior as regards energy consumption, collective consciousness appears at once paralyzed and indecisive … frozen in the face of the obstacle’ (Klein, 2014). Instead of frozen time, Bourriaud points to the acceleration of time and what this has wrought: ‘the great acceleration also lies within the process of the naturalization of capitalism: now it has become both organic and universal, it is the natural law of the Anthropocene’ (cited in Chiambaretta, 2017). Mbembe (2021) expands this argument of the relations of time with the planetary by arguing the politics and aesthetics of the ecological require understanding the coloniality of power and its contemporary temporal mutations. Imperial expansion, Mbembe argues, was (is) a planetary project driven by nationalist states and companies to reallocate the earth’s resources through military might and privatization. Colonial epistemes and practices of time block the potentiality and affirmation of a planetary beyond capture and conquest (Marriott, 2011) but national decolonization cannot be ‘what gives deep breathing for the world’ (Mbembe, 2021). Some physicists speak of ‘eternity in relation to time’, wherein ‘atoms and the emptiness of the universe are infinite, uncreated, and imperishable’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 435). Others speak of chronological and cyclical time, attributing the first to the West and the latter to the East. Newton (1643–1727) defined time as a mathematical variable with one dimension. The only two ‘topological objects with this characteristic’ are a ‘line and a circle … . It thus follows that time is either infinite or cyclic’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 436). Grappling with the question of social death, Frank Wilderson argues that assembling black life into a series of historical events, into a narrative with a plot ‘is a catastrophe for narrative at a meta-level rather than a crisis or aporia within a particular narrative’ (Wilderson, 2015b). For him,

narrative time … marks stasis and change within a [human] paradigm, [but] it does not mark the time of the [human] paradigm, the time of time itself, the time by which the slave’s dramatic clock is set. For the slave, historical ‘time’ is not possible. (Wilderson, 2010, p. 339)

In this article I engage with two dominant logics1 and grammars of time,2 modernity, capitalism, and ecology: time as linear, flowing in a particular direction (determined sequencing separable in measurable units), and time as retrojection, defined as ‘a kind of projection that retrospectively testifies to ‘what comes before’’ (Walker, 2012, p. 268) or after.3 Examining how these two ideas of time become central to the co-production of the planetary as a colonial and imperial project will allow a structural engagement with the emergence and generation of the conditions for decolonial planetary relations as acts of invention (Fanon, 1967; Marriott, 2014).

A Caribbean slave proverb, ‘time is longer dan rope’, challenges the dominant notion of linear time and progress. The state and corporations continue to expropriate black lives and indigenous lands, thus ‘extract[ing] surplus from various processes of social and ecological reproduction’ (McGee & Greiner, 2020), including the obliteration of lives. These structures of death are taken for granted, including the colonial linear structures of progress and growth, their contingent epistemic edifices and the privileges that shape and enable social and ecological reproduction.

Generally speaking, temporal boundaries are drawn to render climate change or ecological crisis theorizable within certain fields, such as environmental, governance, and conservation studies. However, that which is ‘inside’ or embodies a temporal trajectory connotes what is present in the economy, while the ‘outside’ connotes a void (without time). Rather than seeing contemporary readers as always irrevocably distanced from such events, if those who write on climate change focus the language of time, they may open up new possibilities for bringing to the fore substantial structures whose temporality or lived experience is occluded or does not even register as time. In fact, the pervasive tapestries of violence and their temporal structures are challenged by theorists of black thought, indigenous studies, postcolonialism, and Fanonian studies (Rifkin 2017; Wilderson 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Fanon, 1967). They challenge historical and linear time, orienting the reader toward a reality that is neither graspable nor conquerable but a flickering reality of sensed and unsensed ‘actualities, the moment under the moment’ (Hoban, 1992). They problematize easy readings of structures and dominant systems of thought and their entanglement with notions of time, and they query the collective amnesia of temporal productions and the racial capitalist-enslaving-colonial global order where, on the one hand, things are written on water and evaporate (Shafak, 2014, p. 2) and, on the other, certain ecologies and lives are dead on arrival.

Modernist nationalist and capitalist iterations of time focus on linear teleologies/eschatologies. This orientation of the temporal operates through causality, stories of progress and growth, the plausible and possible, and ideas about movement from past to present to future and evolution (Wilk, 2007). However, another orientation, retrojection, I argue, is vital to racial ecological capitalism’s dominant power. Without engaging with both of these structures and operation of time simultaneously, we cannot understand power and its entanglements with the planetary. The temporality of capital’s projection retrospectively testifies to what comes before its current organizing. Retrojection requires us to ‘relocate ourselves into the past’, while ‘assigning purposes and ends to [such] actions’ (Motzkin, 1992) as well as a mythical agency to capital. These two expressions of temporality co-exist, at times in tension. They are inflected in our institutions and our social life.

In this piece, I look at the structure of time and ecology to trace how social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences draw on such structures to colonize, enslave, and imperialize the planetary. I trace how and when time and temporality bound the Anthropocene. The search is not for a start date but for the ways the ‘date’ or the ‘when’ is a political, economic, scientific, and ethical question (Davis & Todd, 2017, p. 761; Rifkin 2017; Whyte, 2017; Saldanha, 2020) entangled with the structure of time and what Fanon calls the invention or new beginning beyond global capital’s projects. I draw on a 2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and work by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway to register the co-production of the temporal with ‘the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason … policy [and] culture, values, subjectivity, emotions and politics’ (Jasanoff, 2004, p. 12).4 I use these works as a springboard for thinking how this temporal co-production expresses the tension between the reproduction of capital and the generation of life. To conclude the piece, in conversation with Octavia E. Butler, I suggest instead of dreading an impending crisis, we should read radically for the ruptures in the dominant structures of time (i.e. in narratives, dialectics, etc.) (Marriott, 2011; Wilderson, 2010) and their entanglement with questions of the planetary and climate change. Such fractal readings may yield insights into possible disinvestment from the fossil economy and open up the possibility for an indeterminate world, the passionate and living experimenting with and harnessing of the flux of energy into a vision of a decolonial whose basic premise is not conquest and enslavement.

Liberalism: always too late, or capitalism’s colonial and enslaving proactivity?

In the IPCC reports, time as a linear human orientation is placed in the context of timescales of forces requiring human intervention but out of human control: climate change. The recent SRl.5 (IPCC, 2018), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’, representing the ‘newer instalment of the scientisation of climate change’, situates ‘the issue beyond democratic debate by declaring it a matter for the scientific expertise of the IPCC’, and inscribes it as an emergency (Garrard, 2020, p. 1). The report suggests ‘climate change is moving faster than we are’ (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018, p. v), and its urgency demands our intervention. However, the moral and ethical articulation of the climate as a linear temporal ‘urgency’ does not allow us to understand ecological shifts or even climate change in a larger trajectory, including human conquest, property relations, and competition. Rather, the report’s ‘foreshortened timeframe’ speaks to the urgent need of global concerted efforts to mitigate climate change and signals how temporary responses and procrastination are not going to do the trick (Garrard, 2020, p. 2).

John Mecklin, Editor of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, similarly reminds us that time is running out:

Faced with this daunting threat landscape and a new willingness of political leaders to reject the negotiations and institutions that can protect civilization over the long term, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board today moves the Doomsday Clock 20 s closer to midnight - closer to apocalypse than ever. (Mecklin, 2020)

The moving of the clock makes the ‘climate emergency’ public, especially for those proponents of liberalism whose ‘macroscopic exclusion clauses’ have been written to ‘displace … unfreedom’ onto all marginalized, enslaved, and colonized peoples and those ‘primitive’ and ‘undeveloped’ sites ‘from a white male bourgeois European who was the historical agent in the narrative’ (Mann, 2019). Yet this moving of the clock does not address the root of the problem. It allows the positing of a secular/humanist eschatological story (Rothe, 2020, p. 162) whose temporal structure is one of immanent destruction, informed by an analysis of existence as being-towards-death (i.e. of the human and the planet) or catastrophe.

Of course, this schematic presumes death and ecological catastrophe (collapsed into one). It represents a never-reached horizon of experience, where authentic and moral decisions must be made through a theory or ‘concept of crisis or emergency’ (Mann, 2019). Liberal leaders of the international political system ‘inch toward’ an implementation of a regulatory system, what Mann and Wainwright call climate Leviathan, instead of addressing the root causes of global warming. These leaders are not creative but ‘fumble … for solutions’, continuing to argue that ‘climate change’ is a ‘market failure, without considering the limiting structures of the ‘market’ itself (Osaka, 2019, p. 2; citing Mann & Wainwright, 2018). When the moment for organized challenge emerges, white hegemony rushes to squander the creative energy and reorients social relations toward its consolidation. It does so by rushing to innovate through the co-production of narratives and an emerging ecological order.

The present as a fracture of notions of history and ‘historical natures’

Apocalypse is ‘the single most powerful master metaphor that the contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal’ (Buell, 1995, p. 285). As such, it deranges capital and its entanglements with ecological problems, ranging from the climate change, to the extinction of species, the loss of pollinating insects, and other ecological disasters. These challenges or this ecology of environmental concerns cannot be considered in a partitioned manner.

The focus on temporality has been picked up by historians and others grappling with what the authors of the Anthropocene name a crisis and emergency. One text that speaks to the global climate change as apocalyptic temporality is Oreskes and Conway’s The Collapse of Western Civilization. In theorizing the present and the temporal possibilities for the future otherwise, these authors open the door for us to experiment with what Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun call sociotechnical imaginaries (2013). The book’s narrator is a Chinese historian in the year 2393. The historian says Western civilization possessed robust information about climate change and the ‘damaging events to unfold’ but was ‘unable to stop’ them (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, p. x, pp. 1-2), thus ‘condemning their successors to the inundation and desertification of the late twenty-first and twentysecond centuries’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, pp. 59–60). A second Dark Age descended, and the Period of Penumbra began. The present ignorance, the historian says, is a result of an ‘ideological fixation on ‘free’ markets; another compartmentalization and the practice among the scientific community of demanding an excessively stringent standard for accepting claims of any kind, even those involving imminent threats’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, pp. ix-x). In a sense, this future scenario tells nothing about the future and more about the ‘present’ – our moment.

However, the narrator’s historical account is problematic and, as Garrard argues ‘unequivocably dangerous’, as the scenario focuses on ‘catastrophic outcomes’ (Garrard, 2020, p. 3). Gallard’s critique is important to our discussion of temporality. Narrating the present as a given history evades uncertainty and possibilities for the world as a project beyond global capital. In a sense, this dystopian temporality posits itself as the ‘truth’ of our reality as if punctuating a certain kind of imaginary temporal orientation – the only one about the future. This depicted history anticipates the failure of the future by drawing on assembled empirics and technologies of problem-solving as if failure and the future are not up for debate (Jasanoff, 2019), as if the historical codes and genre choices that assemble these dystopia future scenarios are not ‘originary’ to the familiar narratives of history which they ground.

In highlighting that the Anthropocene is actually a ‘liberal managerial term’, Mann (2019) suggests the ideology of liberalism distorts the multiple social reproductions of violence and strategies of failure by sublimating them through temporal means, deploying concepts such as crises, emergencies, and exceptions, and substituting adaptation for progress. We see this in scientific reports, for example, the SRl.5 and others; while they address the metabolic rifts and shifts, they still use the Anthropocene as the social contract (Mann, 2019). In Climate Leviathan, Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann argue crisis, risk, and uncertainty are asymmetrical, the result of the actions of a minority of humanity, i.e. the white male bourgeois European who claims the agency and writing of the historical narrative of liberalism and imperial capitalism. The Anthropocene is a technology co-productive of temporal regimes of modernity and the planetary order:

[The Anthropocene is] an explicitly future facing instrument of temporal power. Like all contracts, it restarts time on its terms. The distribution of responsibilities it represents is always also the closure of supersession of past arrangements. So, a contract that has no expiration, like a constitution or the Anthropocene, is supposed to mark the end of the past and the beginning of a new time. (Mann & Wainwright, 2018, p. 8)

The Anthropocene is itself a technology of temporal power which orders and organizes social life. In questioning this contract, Mann and Wainwright problematize how time is used to organize global power. They question whether the idea that the Anthropocene marks the end of the past as many claim and the beginning of a new time is accurate. For them, this fetishization of the Anthropocene evades the intensifying challenges to the world. The structure of ‘transition’ of the contemporary global order and the production of history of liberalism as progress (Mann & Wainwright, 2018, p. 9) are problematic and do not acknowledge how such kinds of politics are co-produced with a structure of transcendental time as their major procedural technology of governance. The transformation of the world’s political economy and the fundamental political arrangements most people take for granted thus need to be engaged on the register of the language of temporal power and the global order.

#### Their take on regenerative ag is not neutral, but rather rooted in a history of white supremacy, slavery, and share cropping. This desire for innovation is driven by agrarian racism.

Williams '17 – University of Georgia [Brian, "Articulating Agrarian Racism: Statistics and Plantationist Empirics," Southeastern Geographer, Volume 57, Number 1, Spring 2017, pp. 12-29] \*\* Highlighted Words modified for racialized language

Agricultural “Industry”

If Stone held that whites were dramatically superior agriculturalists, Willcox’s statistical analysis was framed in part as an investigation of the capacity of Blacks to “develop” and adapt to technological changes in agriculture. His statistical analysis held forth the ostensible possibility of Black adaptation to white technological ideals. Willcox’s starting point, however, was also an assumption of white technological supremacy—or “industry.” He wrote that “Southern agriculture is becoming increasingly diversified, and is demanding and receiving a constantly increasing amount of industry, energy and intelligence—characteristics which the whites more generally possess or more readily develop” (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 453). Willcox pointed to recent elements of mechanization in southern agriculture, arguing that “every improvement in agriculture or industry anywhere tending to lower the price of a staple product is a spur to former producers” (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 456).

In the light of technological changes in agriculture, Willcox argued that any “absolute” progress of Blacks since emancipation was irrelevant because “the test which the race has to face is the test of relative efficiency” (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 456). Thus, due to the productivity of agricultural technology, “the strenuous and increasing industrial competition between the two races often results in local displacement of ~~coloured~~ [Black] labor. The Negro cotton grower, unable to live on the decreasing return from his land, gives place to another tenant, white or black, and the former family drifts away” (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 458). Willcox could hardly have been unaware of evidence contradicting his assertions—even evidence presented on his own terms. In a 1904 Census Bulletin to which Willcox was a chief contributor, “Negroes in the United States,” W.E.B. Du Bois presented statistical evidence that the number of Black farmers in the South were increasing, but emphasized that Black economic prosperity was hindered in much of the “Black Belt” region by the crop-lien system, lack of educational opportunities, and limited access to affordable land (Du Bois 1904, pp 97–98). Where Willcox presented inequality as evidence of white supremacy, Du Bois subtly but effectively emphasized the role of racism in limiting Black agricultural opportunities.

When Stone and Willcox released Studies in the American Race Problem, moreover, the agricultural land grant system— the system responsible for delivering technology and support to farmers—had been institutionalized on a thoroughly separate and unequal basis (Johnson 2011, Harris & Hyden 2017). Indeed, from this uneven foundation, the percentage of total federal and state funds apportioned to Black land grant institutions declined steadily between 1900 and 1932 (Johnson 2011, p 151). The Delta Branch Experiment Station at Stoneville was established as part of this segregated and unequal system of research and support, delivering research and technological help to planters (Giesen 2011, pp 58–59). Nevertheless, Stone and Willcox presented any use of technology as evidence of white superiority, with Willcox arbitrating the effects of “racial competition” through demographic analysis.In the essay “The Probable Increase of the Negro Race in the United States,” Willcox returned to the question of new agricultural technology in the South, reading it through the lens of the “black disappearance hypothesis” (Zuberi 2001). Willcox interpreted occupational and population changes as evidence that “the Negro race in the South, in its competition with the whites”, was losing ground (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 523).1 The increase in cotton manufacturing in the South represented an “invasion of the Negroes’ home,” but offered little opportunity for employment (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 523). He pointed to changes in rice production in Louisiana as proof that whites are more capable of “agriculture by improved methods,” and that these improvements bring prosperity to whites, while contributing to a decline in the Black population (Willcox in Stone 1908, pp 525–526). Finally, Willcox pointed to the advance of the boll weevil as the harbinger of further white competitive advantage in southern agriculture: Energy, ingenuity, and perseverance in surmounting new difficulties are far more characteristic of whites than of Negroes. . .It seems probable that, when the boll weevil reaches the cotton growing district of the lower Mississippi. . .the new pest will contribute in some measure either to decrease the importance of that area as a cotton centre or else to decrease the dominance of Negro labour in the cotton fields there. (Willcox in Stone 1908, p 526–527)

As historian James Giesen has shown, the arrival of the boll weevil precipitated struggles throughout the South over the structure and future of cotton production, and of the means of responding to the threat of the boll weevil itself (Giesen 2011). The plantation elite in the Delta saw the boll weevil as a threat to the power of planters, and particularly their control over Black workers, who they feared would leave upon the arrival of the weevil (Cobb 1992, Giesen 2011). “Under threat by the advancing insect pest”, Giesen writes, “these elite planters thought first of the farm workforce” (Giesen 2011, p 56). Giesen documents that Delta planters, led by Stone, attempted to manipulate and control information about the boll weevil’s destructiveness in order to maintain labor control in Delta agriculture, advocating the planting of more cotton in face of the evidence in support of agricultural diversification (Giesen 2011, pp 61–65). The putative observations Stone made about race and agriculture were conscious interventions intended to strengthen planter power.

Willcox’s demographic analysis, it bears emphasisizing here, was impossible to disentangle from his and Stone’s white supremacist polemics, which played upon widely-held racist assumptions in white American society (Muhammad 2011). The “black disappearance hypothesis” espoused by Willcox linked a plantationist ideology that slavery had been a benevolent institution with a social Darwinist assumption that population changes, measured in racial terms, could prove white competitive superiority and Black inferiority (Zuberi 2001). Framed in this way, racial violence and economic coercion could be taken as proof of white superiority within any areal unit if they led to a measured relative decline in the “Negro population.”2The Great Migration of southern Blacks to northern cities in subsequent decades could, in this framing, be taken as proof positive of inherent white supremacy in the South, rather than as a testament to Black tenacity and ingenuity in the face of white violence and rapid technological change. Stone and Willcox, of course, ignored uneven access to capital and institutional support for capital-based agricultural intensification (See Daniel 1985, Johnson 2011, Reid and Bennet 2012). Instead, they used competition as evidence of innate Black inferiority, interpreting technological changes as functions of racial “industry,” rather than moments of racial formation within supremely unequal material context of plantation agriculture after the violent overthrow of Reconstruction (Du Bois 1935, Cobb 1993, Willis 2000).

Stone and Willcox employed a double meaning of industry in agriculture. On one hand, industry signified the willingness and commitment to work. Formed in opposition with supposed Black “shiftlessness and improvidence,” this definition revolved around the normalization of whiteness as agricultural aptitude. On the other hand, industry was defined by intelligence and the mastery of technological developments in agriculture.

Through this notion of “industry” and the ontology of racial competition, Stone’s plantationism and Willcox’s demographic analysis were articulated—in Hall’s (1996) dual sense of linking and expressing—as an anti-Black agrarian epistemology beyond the confines of the plantation South. Willcox argued that the collaboration between a planter and statistician would bring together disciplines and regions: “The statistician, knowing little or the problem beyond what he may read in his figures, finds in Mr. Stone’s papers a needed complement, and also in the main I believe a confirmation of his results. Thus, North and South, theory and practice, figures and concrete specific experience are approaching a unity of conviction” (Willcox in Stone 1908, pp xv-xvi) [emphasis added]. By presenting competition as a neutral arbiter of racial agrarian worth, and representing the effects of racial violence and an agricultural state and economy geared toward planter success as inherent white agricultural industry, the coupling of Stone’s plantation empirics and Willcox’s statistics provided a framework for situating the plantation within national concepts of agricultural development.

Stone and Willcox’s emphasis on “racial competition” is particularly insidious when put in the context of pervasive and enduring discrimination against Black farmers and landowners (Green et al. 2011, Daniel 2012, Grim 2012, Reid and Bennet 2012). By rebranding exclusion, exploitation and discrimination as white agricultural “industry,” work like that of Stone and Willcox provided both a rationale and a blueprint for the continuation of the plantation in and through the institutions of the agricultural state.2 White agrarian modernizers looked backwards to the specter of Black landownership or Black labor and used it to justify continued agrarian racism. A decade after Studies in the American Race Problem was released, for example, a survey of Mississippi state resources wrote that “The day of slipshod, unscientific methods of farming in Mississippi is past. Ignorant butchering of the soil by unsupervised negro labor, with resulting slight yields, is no longer permissible” (Lowe 1919, p 224).

But try as Stone, Willcox and others might to cast Black farmers and workers as inferior, bound to disappear in the face of the “factor of white competition,” myriad Black farmers continued to hold onto land and carve out diverse agrarian spaces in spite of tremendous obstacles. Black agricultural communities like Mound Bayou, in the Mississippi Delta, provided important sites of relative autonomy and mobilization in the Mississippi Delta during the Jim Crow era, and still exist today (Woods 1998, Willis 2000). Scholars have stressed the significant decline of Black farmers in the 20th century (Hinson & Robinson 2008, Green et al. 2011, Reid & Bennett 2012, Daniel 2013), but the fact that many were able to persist in spite of such adversity is a testament to the power of Black organization and ingenuity in the rural South.

Black farming and landownership was, in fact, both a platform for and object of southern Black freedom struggles in the South. In many parts of the rural South, Black-owned farms served as a space to challenge economic and political oppression, and Black farmers provided critical support to freedom struggle organizing— even as mechanization was wielded as a political weapon against Black agricultural workers (Payne 1995, Woods 1998, Woodruff 2003, Gilbert & Wood 2004). The southern Black freedom struggles mobilized alternative visions of agricultural development, within what Woods (1998, 2007) has characterized as the “blues tradition” of organizing. Fannie Lou Hamer, for example, founded the Freedom Farms Cooperative in Ruleville, Mississippi less than a decade after being removed from a plantation for registering to vote (Lee 1999, Woods 1997). Black farmers throughout the South challenged USDA discrimination and exclusion, forming cooperatives and contesting local USDA elections (see for example De Jong 2002, Ashmore 2008, Jeffries 2009).

The emphasis that Stone and Willcox placed on white ingenuity and “industry” in agricultural practice depended upon denying the profound historical role that Blacks have played in shaping American agricultural practice. As Judith Carney has extensively documented, for example, rice production in North America relied extensively upon the ingenuity of African production practices introduced by slaves (Carney 2001). And as Giesen has argued, the innovations of Black farmers and workers in controlling the boll weevil has been systematically ignored or misattributed to the innovations of white farmers and agricultural researchers (Giesen 2011, pp 27–29). From the very establishment of plantation agriculture, Stone and Willcox’s supposed white ingenuity in “improved agriculture” was rebranded theft and coercion. Ignoring power relations, however, Stone and Willcox treated inequalities in the ownership of agriculture and land as proof of white superiority.

Many scholars have documented the consolidation of twentieth-century agriculture and the favoring of large-scale interests in US agricultural policy (see for example Lobao & Meyer 2001, Freidmann 2005, McMichael 2009, Carolan 2012), a scale bias which intensified the dispossession through pervasive discrimination against non-white farmers (Daniel 2012, Reid and Bennett 2012). The US federal court ruling in Pigford v. Glickman, which established that African American farmers were entitled to compensation for USDA discrimination, highlighted a piece of a long history of the USDA’s role in shaping differential outcomes in agriculture through racist practices (Daniel 2012, Grim 2012). Yet as I have emphasized through a focus on Stone and Willcox, the injustices of the 20th century USDA are historically-rooted, and exceed the state. Agricultural industrialization, particularly, was shaped by anti-Black epistemological project which combined statistical practices of calculating population-level “racial competition” and plantationist truth claims of white agrarian superiority. Both the scale bias of 20th century agricultural policy and the myriad moments of USDA discrimination are part of a deeper history of white anxiety and plantationist investment in notions of “industry” as agrarian superiority. Studies in the American Race Problem represents just one moment in which the effects of antiBlack violence were articulated through national statistical practices as evidence of white agrarian worth. Yet power of the innovative practices of growing and surviving practiced by Black farmers and agricultural workers in the South gave lie to Stone and Willcox’s theories—the myriad attempts to “conceal, yet violently situate” Blacks within the plantation South (McKittrick & Woods 2007, p 2).

#### No correlation between food shortages and conflict—other factors

Buhaug et al 15 [Halvard Buhaug, Peace Research Institute in Oslo an Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Tor Benjaminsen, Espen Sjaastad, Ole Magnus Theisen.] “Climate variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa” Environmental Research Letters, Volume 10, Number 12 (http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/12/125015) - MZhu

Across all models, we find relatively weak and insignificant effects for domestic food production and we also note that the sign of the coefficients shifts between outcome types. In this sense, table 1 implicitly contrasts both claims that political violence is more prevalent when basic needs are met (Salehyan and Hendrix 2014) and claims that agricultural income shocks increase civil conflict risk (von Uexkull 2014). The results are consistent with Koubi et al (2012) and van Weezel (2015), however, who conclude that rainfall—a significant determinant of yields in SSA—has little impact on conflict either directly or through economic performance. The covariate that best and most consistently explains temporal variation in political violence is the time-lagged conflict incidence indicator. Models 1–2 show that a new civil conflict is unlikely to break out if another one is already ongoing in the same country whereas Models 3–6, which capture the occurrence of less organized conflict, demonstrate that violence begets violence. Coups d'état (Models 7–8) exhibit a comparatively weak temporal correlation pattern in our data and are generally regarded as a highly unpredictable phenomenon (Luttwak 1979). Next, we estimate the same set of models on a subsample of 14 countries in SSA where rainfall has a large and significant positive effect on food production (figure 2(b); see supplementary information, section B for details). To better capture the influence of climate variability and reduce concerns with endogeneity, we further replace the standard OLS model with two-stage instrumental variable regression. The first stage in this model estimates the joint influence of annual rainfall (linear and squared terms) and temperature (linear) on contemporaneous food production. This effect then constitutes the exogenous instrument for food production in the second stage. The results are reported in table 2. Mirroring the results presented above, we fail to uncover a robust signal for agricultural performance, although the sign of the coefficient for food production now remains negative in seven of the eight specifications. Food production shocks may have different consequences depending on the socioeconomic context, so next we consider a series of interactive relationships. Specifically, we investigate the joint effect of food production and (i) low level of development, (ii) extent of discriminatory political system, and (iii) economic dependence on agriculture; three conditions whereby loss of income from agriculture might constitute a particular challenge to society. To model these interactions, we include time-varying regressors instead of country-fixed effects where (i) is represented by infant mortality rate (IMR; World Bank 2014), (ii) is captured using the Ethnic Power Relations v.1.1 data (Cederman et al 2010), while (iii) uses an index of agricultural contribution to GDP (World Bank 2014). Moreover, to preserve focus on temporal dynamics, food production is now operationalized as yearly deviation from the country mean, 1961–2009. We use additive inverse deviation values to ensure theoretical consistency among the components in the interaction terms. All models control for (ln) population size, conflict history, and a common time trend, and models without IMR and agricultural dependence additionally control for (ln) GDP per capita. The results are presented in table 3. Again, we are unsuccessful in establishing a consistent covariation pattern between agricultural performance and political violence. Interpreting the combined effect of interaction terms with continuous parameters is inherently difficult but figure 4 shows that food production is insignificantly related to all conflict outcomes across levels of socioeconomic development for all three interaction terms. The sole exception is the result in Model 24, where lower food production in highly discriminatory societies is negatively associated with non-state conflict. This result would seem to contradict the standard scarcity thesis (Homer-Dixon 1999) although it is consistent with observations that conflict is more prevalent during surplus years (Witsenburg and Adano 2009, Salehyan and Hendrix 2014). Mirroring earlier research, ethnopolitical exclusion is strongly related to higher civil conflict risk, but not necessarily to other forms of political violence. Infant mortality rate and economic dependence on agriculture appear largely irrelevant. While this may come as a surprise, recall that most countries in SSA are characterized by underdevelopment and a large agricultural sector, implying that the variation in values on these indicators is modest. Large parameter uncertainties and p-values above the conventional significance threshold (5%) may disguise substantively important effects (Ward et al 2010). Accordingly, as a final assessment, we conduct a set of out-of-sample simulations and compare predictions for models with and without food production. The models are estimated on a subset of the full sample, in this case all years before 2000, and the estimated effects are then used to predict conflict outcomes out of sample, i.e., the 2000–09 period. Figure 5 shows the predicted values from four pairs of models that are specified similarly to Models 17, 20, 23, and 26, except for the shorter time period and the fact that one model in each pair drops the food production deviation variable. For civil conflict and social unrest, the models generate very similar predictions, signaling that agricultural performance adds little to the models' predictive power. There is more spread in the predictions for the remaining two outcome categories. Puzzlingly, the model without food production performs better in both cases—i.e., the Receiver Operating Characteristics curves have higher 'Area Under the Curve' scores. We hesitate to put too much emphasis on the ROC tests, given the rareness of the outcomes (notably Models 17 and 26) and the relatively small training samples (Models 20 and 23), but nonetheless the patterns observed in the out-of-sample simulations substantiate the regression results reported above; fluctuations in agricultural output explain little of the observed variation in political violence in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. 5. Concluding remarks Emerging evidence suggests that food price shocks are associated with an increase in social unrest (Smith 2014, Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Weinberg and Bakker 2015). Yet, the robust 'non-finding' presented here implies that so-called 'food riots' play out largely isolated from climate-sensitive production dynamics in the affected countries. Likewise, claims that adverse weather and harvest failure drive contemporary violence in Africa (e.g., Hsiang et al 2013, IFPRI 2015) are not supported by our analysis. Instead, social protest and rebellion during times of food price spikes may be better understood as reactions to poor and unjust government policies, corruption, repression, and market failure (e.g., Bush 2010, Buhaug and Urdal 2013, Sneyd et al 2013, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).

### 1NC – Labor

#### The analytic of labor power is incomplete because it leaves untouched modernity’s temporal grammar. This is offense because they actively obscure the colonial violence of enslavement.

Agathangelou, 21—Associate Professor, Department of Politics, York University (Anna, “On the question of time, racial capitalism, and the planetary,” Globalizations, 18:6, 880-897, dml)

Moore’s philosophy of history is inscribed with a structure of time which moves from attachments that exhaust and create antagonism to an attachment that dialectically mobilizes a planetary revolution. In Moore’s monist terms, all energy systems and human economies are ‘co-produced’ with nature. Thus, in thinking and understanding the present and the emerging futures ‘[o]nly a conception of historical nature will suffice’ (Moore, 2015, p. 296). But if nature is confined to the utopia of capitalism and capital’s history, then ‘nature’ can only be extended as a servile representation – a mimetic mode of what is experientially felt to be violence – and so is always already trapped inside a predefined meaning of what counts as ‘materiality’ and ‘history’. If theft and exhaustion interrupt the movement towards ‘nature’, and paradoxically make speciology (or what is nature; see the ancients’ idea of water, air, fire, earth and space) irrelevant for understanding materiality and history, then ethics and politics (insofar as they are grounded on this notion of nature) cannot simply be invoked, even negatively, as a model for thinking nature and even less so for dialectics and revolution (Marriott, 2011). Moore resolves this puzzle by coming up with an anthropological description of the theft and exhaustion of this nature that is singular, even if the radical singularity of that description remains bound to colonialism, enslavement and primitive accumulation as lived temporalities. Of course, Moore’s focus on capitalism’s dependence on world ecology is a perversion that cannot be worked out by stretching history or read through a theory of the structure of time and perversion; no concept or epistemology can attain the value of (non-perverse) mastery, as this situation is ‘originary’ to the history of enslavement and colonialism (Niblett, 2019).

In The Sublime Perversion of Capital, Gavin Walker shows how capital segregates the world into nation-states through the apparatus of capture and assemblage of accumulation regimes:

[W]e must always treat the process of primitive accumulation as a dual process: on the one hand, it connotes the untraceable historical emergence of labor power which can be commodified, and on the other hand, it is a historical site of the Ur-Akt6 that founded and ordered the world as a nomos, as a system. These two aspects are, intimately joined: the first sets in motion the paradoxical cycle of social relations called ‘capital,’ while the second organizes the ‘formation of difference’ through which the earth’s surface is recoded as a ‘forcefield’ of the order. (Walker, 2012, p. 118)

The making of this order and its contingent social contracts is based on ‘primitive accumulation’ and its mutations (Marx, 1967; Agathangelou, 2019; Agathangelou & Ahmed, 2020; Sakai & Solomon, 2006, p. 28). Walker argues the state comes to be understood as the ‘ultimate model of the capitalist axiomatic’, thereby identifying the nation with the ‘origin’ of the rational and universal process of exchange (Walker, 2012, p. 122). However, this is a demented and paradoxical process caught between the logic of capital, nation-state and ‘history.’ Thus, it is not enough to point to capital’s historiography, colonial and genocidal, and its ‘teleological thrust’ (Marriott, 2012, p. 53). If the aim is to challenge capital’s history, then we have to contest capitalism’s colonialisms and genocides ‘in a more general description of its language of time’ (Marriott, 2012). The logic of capital depends on the language of retrojection as a temporal grammar to surpass its limits and to posit itself anew in the way it exploits and obliterates species and nature (Malm, 2018). If we do not contest these retrojective linguistic mechanisms of time, we will continue participating in the same capture and theft upon which the ecological regime of racial global capital depends. On the one hand, this moment of capture, cycles back to itself, ‘harness[ing] its hazardous flux retrospectively, to conjure itself up as if its origin were a mere testament to its necessary emergence’ (Walker, 2012, p. 157). On the other, history or the history of the capture is a fait accompli from the vantage point of the racial capitalocene (Walker, 2012, p. 157).

Moore acknowledges exhaustion and its acceleration are a result of ‘capital’s appropriation of unpaid work [which] transcends the Cartesian divide, encompassing both human and extra human work as outside, but necessary to, the circuit of capital and the production of value’ (Moore, 2017, p. 329). However, dialectical history emerges as a question in his analysis because of the ‘metabolic shift’. The teleology seems to creep in to supervene in the situating of the ‘revolutionary ecology’ as an end. Without theorizing explicitly the structure of language of time of ecological revolution, it is not possible to invent (Fanon, 1967) ‘a future … that is radically unwriteable’ or a ‘tabula rasa’ which ‘opens in return a movement of temporalization that is never simply present, or timely’ (Fanon, 1967; Marriott, 2011, p. 54).

An engagement with this structure and its language points to the technologies of racial capitalocene, including Cartesian dualism which is a temporal method of translating retrojectively the otherwise unsignified energies of existence. Walker argues, ‘We are always arriving on the stage of history after the fold in power has already taken place. This fold in power is constantly being renewed through its temporality, which is inherently retrospectively projected’ (Walker, 2012, p. 152). We can formulate a more productive response to those who argue that we can imagine the end of the world but not racial capitalocene once we grapple with the relations of the structure of time to the paradoxical suspension of time or what Fanon and Marriott call the new beginnings (Fanon, 1967; Marriott, 2011). Primitive accumulation, (‘the internal energy of African slaves and Indigenous lands’ (da Silva, 2018)), ‘is not a period, but a cyclically reproduced logical moment’ (Walker, 2012, p. 119) that becomes history by repeating itself every day. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of primitive accumulation as the mounting of an apparatus of capture, Walker suggests the capitalist system presupposes this violent process. In this sense, the linear notion of history that characterizes explanations of the racial capitalocene and its contingent projects is paradoxical (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 447). Capitalism cyclically-recursively repeats the moment of the mounting of capture apparatus within the sphere of social relations as a ‘crisis’. These acts are impossible to ‘historicize’ as ‘they are an irreparable moment of the modern condition, whose effects we are still living through … That is, we ourselves have always-already been ‘enclosed,’ and therefore the historicization of enclosure throws us back on the very limit of historicity itself’ (Walker, 2012, p. 102). And yet, the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences insist ‘historicizing’ through linear, eschatological narratives and dialectics (Agathangelou, 2016; Marriott, 2011). Marriott goes even further. He puts pressure on the rush to historicize in the form of dramatic narratology or dialectics. He argues that history is a colonial violent racist machinery. In his words,

After all, what brings race into being as an historical concept is the European invention of Man, which also gave birth to its multiple others, whose relationship to history is necessarily one of a relegated past. So perhaps, for Fanon, in the colony, history as a discipline became, quite precisely, racist: a narrative whose redoubtable but all the more easily identified representations are the clearest example of a discursive machinery of power.

If we take seriously this ‘historical’ production that depends on relegating others to the past, then a historical contextualization or dating of capitalism by highlighting how nature has been ignored or how ‘the history of capitalist origins … is also the origins of ecological crisis’ (Moore 2017, p. 2) cannot resolve this ‘crisis.’ It leaves untouched colonialism and ‘the description of its language of time’ (Marriott, 2012, p. 53) and the temporal narratives that orient us toward crisis or aporias and by extension the need for ecological revolution.

For Rob Nixon, violence is an ecological question, and time and representation are entangled: ‘Slow violence occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all’ (Nixon, 2011, pp. 2–3). Ecological injustice revealed through the ‘slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes’ disproportionately affects people of colour and the Global South (Nixon, 2011, p. 2). These ‘gradual’ catastrophes challenge the linear and historical ecological crisis narratives and their notions of temporality whose cause and effect logic demand certain kinds of reparations and responses. They challenge a contemporary quick/urgent media ecology more suited to telling stories about disasters.

The entanglement of time and representation is all-encompassing (Callaway, 2014; Clark, 2011). Yet we have to remember the effect of the politics of representation on the registers of grammars and logics of colonialism and global racial capitalism and its environmental expropriations and devastations as a planetary project. Simply focusing on first principles evades that colonialism and global racial capitalism have not only immured ecologies and species but have also immured the writing of ecological history, the writing of the planetary, including systems of thought such as those produced by black, postcolonial, and indigenous thinkers/activists (Marriott, 2011). Thus, while materials such as narratives, codes, genres, and genealogies of colonialism and enslavement block the potentiality of the colonized, they are equally able to block the recursive processes and practices that inform conversation on the postponement of the catastrophe of the planetary. Such ‘a/historical’ asymmetries can never escape the concept of history, thereby allowing racial capitalism to seize upon given differences to continue its business as usual (Marriott, 2012).

As we think this through, we can see how, through environmental economics of growth, ecological experiments with linear, eschatological and retrojective structures of time and the temporalizing of desires and hazards, capital evades its biggest secret: capital cannot produce ecologies and life. It can enslave, colonize, engage in theft of land as property, and commodify ecologies and life into labour power and obliterate those it needs as its ‘basis for defining time’ (Rifkin, 2017, p. vii; Johnson, 2000) and for gaining coherence of its projects, but it cannot make life or beings. The enslaved, colonized, labour, and planetary power do not exist as such. They are co-produced with the language of colonial time and global colonial planetary projects. Walker comments:

Labor power is called into being when its use-value, labor, is employed in the process of production. At that point, labor power is retrospectively made to have existed; in other words, its basic temporality is exactly the future anterior (‘it will have been’) .. . When capital needs to expand, it presumes the existence of frontiers and free lands and a supply of labor power but it conceals to itself the ecological hazard of securing these supplies. It posits for itself a semblance which fills the void and allows the circular logic of its cycle to smoothly continue (Walker, 2012, p. 187).

## Block

### Kritik

#### **Proven in the Cribb card- it says UA would have to occur in order for the Aff to solve**.

Cribb 17—(author, journalist, editor and science communicator). Julian Cribb. 2017. “The Devourer (Homo Devorans).” Surviving the 21st Century, Springer International Publishing, pp. 123–146. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-41270-2\_7.

Modern food systems depend on technology—but they also depend on finite resources such as soil, oil, fish, fertiliser, and clean water: put simply, the dilemma we face in the twenty-first Century is that we have an expanding global demand for food that is reliant on a contracting global resource base. Furthermore, a food system that depends critically on good weather is likely to suffer in a world becoming more climatically volatile. For these reasons both the diet and how we produce our food must, and will, change. Indeed, over the twenty-first century food will evolve more rapidly and amazingly than in any previous era of history. We are, in fact, embarking on one of the great ages of humanity, The Age of Food.

What humans eat a century from now, how we produce and consume it, its health value and composition will seem as strange to us today, as our modern foods might appear to our own great great grandparents—before the age of cosmopolitan cuisine, cold storage, takeaway, manufactured food, celebrity chefs and cooking shows. This food revolution will arise as a result of implacable demand and resource pressures building up throughout the global food system, coupled with the advent of remarkable new technologies and emerging popular trends in farming, health and sustainability.

Food Insecurity

There are ten main factors which drive global food insecurity, two on the demand side and eight on the supply side. Most attempts to explain what is happening in world food tend to overlook several of these factors, yet all are of importance, all are interwoven and all must be addressed together if the global food supply is to remain secure through the twenty-fi rst Century, the era of ‘ peak people’ .

On the demand side, the requirement for a doubling in global food production is driven by population growth (which is cased both by birth rates and by people living longer lives) and rising living standards coupled with economic demand for higher quality, richer, more nutritious foods, especially in developing and newly industrialising countries.

On the supply side, the main things that limit our ability to double food production are:

• Physical loss and decline in fertility of soils worldwide, combined with a shrinking world farming area

• Scarcities of fresh, clean water in heavily populated regions while megacities and the energy sector combine to steal farmers’ water, reducing the amount available for food production

• Uncertain availability and high cost of liquid transport fuels out to midcentury and beyond

• Emerging scarcities of high-quality mineral fertilisers by mid-century, making them unaff ordable to most farmers

• Continuing decline and potential collapse of wild fi sh stocks due to overfi shing and ocean pollution

• Global decline in public sector investment in food, agricultural and fi sheries science, leading to stagnation in crop, pasture and fi sheries yields and a marked increase in diet-related disease across the human population

• A worldwide drought of ‘patient capital’ for new investment in farming and food production, along with speculative investment in farm land and commodities and ‘landgrabs’ by speculators and rich corporations

• Extinction of the temperate climate which gave rise to agriculture and its replacement by a far more uncertain climatic regime characterised by more frequent and intense floods, storms and droughts, heatwaves and loss of production on farms.

It is the synergy between these ten drivers that is the primary cause of global food insecurity, present and future. Solving several of them does not solve the food problem: a food secure world requires the solution of all ten problems simultaneously, and in ways that do not conflict with one another. There are no miracle cures: even the highest-yielding ‘super crop’ still relies on having adequate soil, water, oil, chemicals and fertiliser and a stable climate to grow in. The sheer scale of the challenge of raising output at a time of global resource contraction is poorly grasped by governments, consumers and much of the food industry itself.

The Spanish, who undoubtedly learned it from bitter experience, have an old saying that “ Th ere are only seven meals between civilisation and anarchy ”: if the population goes unfed for more than a couple of days, heads at the top are liable to roll. Historically, both the French and Russian revolutions arose out of famines, the genocide in Rwanda and the civil war in Darfur both originated in disputes over food, land and water between ethnic groups, and in 2012 governments in Egypt and Tunisia fell as a result of popular movements that began as food protests. In the twenty-first Century regional famines, hunger and disputes over food, land and water are potential triggers for civil insurrection, government collapse, refugee tsunamis, genocides and even international wars.

How Many People?

Tonight around two hundred thousand more people will sit down to dinner than dined last night. Growth in the human population, however, is not simply a matter of babies born: it is also down to well-off people living longer lives. Th e average resident of a country with a high life expectancy will consume 35,000 more meals than someone living in a country where most people still die comparatively young (World Health Organization 2012 ). Furthermore, a 7 The Devourer (Homo devorans) 125 baby born to an affl uent couple will occupy from six to ten times more of the planet’s limited resources than does one born to poor parents. Rich societies thus contribute disproportionately to the stress on the world’s increasingly limited resources of soil, water, minerals and energy—and hence to the risk of famine and confl ict over those resources. It follows that, if all humans are to enjoy a moderate to good standard of living, the planet can only support a fraction of its present population over the long-run.

By the close of this century—barring major crises—there could well be 11 billion mouths to feed. The United Nations Population Division’s medium fertility forecast estimates the world population will hit 10 billion in 2062 and 11 billion in the 2090s ( UN ESA 2014 ). Some commentators, such as Professor of Statistics Adrian Raftery of Washington University, caution it could go as high as 12 billion (Hickey 2014 ). On the other hand, argues Paul Ehrlich, author of the famous 1969 book The Population Bomb, the global spread of feminism and growth in women’s economic opportunities combined with a campaign to encourage smaller families, could equally see the human population peak at 8.5 billion in the 2050s, and then commence a slow decline (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2014 ). Th e Earth’s long-term carrying capacity is uncertain, depending as it does on the living standards and food choices of individuals: biologist E.O.Wilson put it at ten billion—provided, he said, everyone turned vegetarian (Wolchover 2011 ). However, as noted in Chap. 3, humans are already using 1.6 Planet Earths to meet our current needs—so the limiting factors may well be resources like soil and water (World Footprint Network 2016 ). This implies the planet’s long-term carrying capacity of humans, living at a reasonable standard, may be closer to the four billion it held in 1974. Some, such as Ehrlich, argue it is more like two billion, at our present living standards. Th ese are the sorts of targets a wise humanity would be aiming for over the coming century if it wishes to ensure its long term survival, wellbeing and prosperity. In the meantime, however, we have to plan to feed the world through a period of several decades of ‘ peak people’ until the women of the world can suffi ciently lower human numbers by reducing their own fertility, as they are presently doing in all regions of the globe.

Predictions about the size of food demand required to satisfy the world population out to 2050 range from a growth rate of 1.1–1.5 % every year (McKenzie and Williams 2015 ). This puts growth in food demand at between 59 and 98 % in the coming 40 years. Th e large variation depends on whether one assumes newly-affluent countries will adopt western levels of meat-eating—already evident in China, for example—or stick to a predominantly vegetarian diet (as many Indians may prefer).

To meet both population and economic demand growth in places like China, India, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East and beyond, global food availability from all sources must double within half a century. In volume terms, this involves producing more food in the coming 40 years than we did in the last 5000 (Th e Economist 2015a ). However almost everything needed to do this by traditional agriculture is becoming scarce: soil, water, nutrients, energy, technology, fish, capital and a stable, reliable climate.

It is this collision between burgeoning demand and shrinking resources that makes food the primary challenge of our age—more immediate, even, than climate change (Cribb 2011 ).

Water Wars

The first great scarcity to strike agriculture will be water. By the 2020s about 2.9 billion people in 48 countries will be by facing with acute water stress, a United Nations report warns. “The need to grow more food, produce more energy, and increase luxury goods production will drive ever greater demand for water… Th e ultimate consequence is that, by 2030, demand for water could be 40 % greater than supply available.” (Schuster-Wallace and Sandford 2015b )

The average citizen of Planet Earth uses about 1386 tonnes of fresh water a year—a thousand tonnes of it in the form of food (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2007 ). In the course of a lifetime, we each use enough fresh water to fl oat the USS Enterprise , a rather large aircraft carrier (95,000 tonnes). Th at refreshing morning cup of coff ee took 140 l of water just to grow the beans, and your slice of toast 40 l for the wheat. Th at neat little T-shirt took 4 tonnes of water merely to produce the cotton. Your evening glass of wine involved 120,000 ml of water just to produce 150 ml of fermented grape juice. Your chicken dinner required 6 tonnes of water to grow the grain that fed the chook that you ate (Lenntech 2014 ). If it was red meat, a kilo of grainfed beef uses around 15 tonnes of water. Yet few of us spare a second’s thought for the prodigious volumes of water embodied in our daily diet—or the colossal impact that it’s withdrawal from rivers and aquifers is having on fresh water supplies and on landscapes worldwide. Around 70% of all the fresh water used by humanity goes into production of irrigated crops and pastures (UN Food and Agriculture Organisation 2014 ) which in turn supply nearly half the world’s food (the rest is from rain-fed farming). And the share of irrigated food production is growing year by year, as water supplies in dryland farming regions become increasingly stressed by climate change. As British author Fred Pearce graphically put it “as a typical meat-eating, beer-swilling, 7 The Devourer (Homo devorans) 127 milk- guzzling Westerner, I consume as much as a hundred times my own weight in water every day.” (Pearce 2006 )

This over-extraction of fresh water for food production is having a punitive impact on the world’s rivers, lakes and groundwater sources, especially in warm, dry regions. In many of the world’s food bowl regions groundwater is being extracted to water crops far faster than it recharges, with water tables in parts of China and India diminishing by a metre or more a year (Doll et al. 2012 ). As we noted in Chap. 3, groundwater is important because it constitutes 95 % or more of the available fresh water on the planet, and once removed, is only replaced at geological rates: for example, it is estimated that once pumped dry, parts of the Ogallala aquifer that waters farms on the American High Plains may take up to 6000 years to refi ll (Biello 2012 ). Groundwater currently supplies more than 40 % of the world’s food (Wada 2012 ) and by the mid-century, according to UN Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates, it may need to supply 60 %, owing to a scarcity of new rain-fed farmlands. At contemporary rates of extraction, many of the world’s most essential groundwater sources in Asia, South Asia, the Americas, North Africa and the Middle East will become exhausted in the 2030s, risking a crisis in world food security and posing a direct threat to the lives of four billion people who depend on food grown using well water. Loss of groundwater also imperils the forests and landscape vegetation which depend on it, as its removal lowers the water table beyond the reach of tree and shrub roots, causing them to die: this, in turn, affects both livestock grazing and forest food production. Flying gravity instruments in satellites high above the Earth, scientists at NASA obtained a bird’s eye glimpse of groundwater depletion around the planet (Fig. 7.1 ), finding that 13 out of 21 key basins are now stressed. They say:

Most of the major aquifers in the world’s arid and semi-arid zones—the parts of the world that rely most heavily on groundwater—are experiencing rapid rates of depletion because of water use by farms… this includes include the North China Plain, Australia’s Canning Basin, the Northwest Sahara Aquifer System, the Guarani Aquifer in South America, the High Plains and Central Valley aquifers of the United States, and the aquifers beneath northwestern India and the Middle East (Voiland 2014 )

Farmers all around the world are engaged in a fight for their livelihoods— and for our food supply—with vast cities and giant energy corporations which covet their dwindling water supplies. Swollen megacities in Asia, North America and Europe are absorbing vast quantities of new water every year. Large areas of groundwater are being drained, disrupted and polluted by oil 128 Surviving the 21st Century and gas exploration (“fracking”) 1 tar-sands oil production and the excavation (and drainage) of open-cut coal mines. When fossil fuel corporations, cities and farming communities come into collision over water rights, the farmers (and hence, we consumers) almost invariably lose (See for example Finley 2012 ). As one Australian farmers’ protest group explains:

Our best food-producing lands and our fi nest natural areas are at risk from inappropriate coal and gas mining. Coal and gas exploration licences and applications cover more than 50 % of Australia and there are plans to double our coal exports and become the biggest gas exporter in the world. On the driest continent on earth, water is our most precious resource. Despite this, mining…is putting at risk our drinking water catchments, our underground water resources, and our rivers and wetlands (Impacts 2015)

Meanwhile rainfall in the world’s great grain bowls is becoming less reliable as the climate changes and warms, while snowpack on high mountain chains—such as the Himalaya, Hindu Kush, Urals, Andes and Rockies, which supply many of the world’s great rivers and groundwater systems on which food production depends—is dwindling. (World Glacier Monitoring 2015 ; Brown 2011 ) In many countries farmers rely on these big rivers running year-round to water their crops, but if the frozen ‘water tower’ of mountain glaciers disappears, the rivers will only run seasonally. In some regions, such as northern India, Pakistan and Central Asia, this could halve irrigated food production.

All of these factors are placing increased stress on global food supplies at the precise moment in history when they need to increase. They are the result of poor or corrupt water allocation decisions by governments, ignorance of the resource, lack of foresight and the future-blind application of the market, setting prices on water which farmers cannot afford but others can.

Soil

The farmers of Iowa, USA, are among the world’s most proficient at what they do, which is chief y grow crops of corn and soybeans and raise livestock. But according to Iowa State University they still lose about 30 million tonnes of top soil a year, mainly to storm erosion—and that in turn entails the loss of around US$1 billion in grain production. In a severe rainstorm, the losses can run as high as 64 tonnes of topsoil per acre. It’s an unarguable fact that agriculture involves disturbing the topsoil, either by tillage or grazing, and no conventional farming system avoids it completely. However, if good farmers are losing so much soil, you can imagine what the not-so-good manage to lose. (Eller 2014 ; Cox et al. 2012 ) A century ago this issue hardly mattered: there was abundant new forest land to be cleared to replace any that became degraded. Now, with the world’s forests and farm lands both shrinking, that is no longer the case.

In total, soil scientists estimate, the world is losing around 75 billion tonnes of topsoil a year, mainly due to food production (Wilkinson and McElroy 2006 ). In a separate measure of the same phenomenon, satellites have revealed the world’s farm land area is shrinking at the alarming rate of about 1 % a year (Bai et al. 2008 ) as some of it is turned into desert, and some is buried beneath sprawling cities. If this trend continues, they warn, the world could run out of good arable land within 50–70 years (Marler and Wallin 2006 ; Crawford 2012 ).

The fault lies not with the farmers, who struggle to make a living from the declining prices which the global food chain pays for their produce. The problem lies with the merciless and future-blind economics of the global food system, which push farmers and their industries into unsustainable production in the quest for ever-cheaper food. The food in the supermarket is cheap— often one third or less what our grandparents paid for it (Van Trump 2015 ). But it has a hidden cost in lost soil, mined and polluted water, wasted nutrients, degraded landscapes, ruined farmers and rural communities, which is now damaging agriculture around the planet.

The solution to this issue is twofold: to reduce the economic stress on farmers and farming systems, everywhere so they can operate more sustainably (Cribb 2011 ) and to move to soilless or far more intensive systems of food production such as hydroponics, aquaponics, biocultures and vertical farms in urban areas (this chapter).

Terrible Waste

Ours is the first generation in human history to throw away half our food.

Between one third and a half of the eff orts of the world’s farmers, horticulturalists and agri-scientists, amounting to 1.3 billion tonnes of food a year worth over $1 trillion, are sent to landfi ll or else rot in the fi elds (Gustavsson et al. 2011b ). Th e wastage is highest in the developed world, where it amounts to between 95 and 115 k per person, compared with losses in South Asia, SE Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa of 5–11 k a head. While 800 million people go hungry, the world trashes enough food to feed more than two billion. Th e waste is driven primarily by a global food chain which values food too cheaply, and pays farmers too little for it. In the century of global food insecurity, this is neither moral, nor economic nor sustainable.

However, since none of the rich countries which waste their food are prepared to transport it in edible condition to poor countries which lack sustenance (i.e. redistribute food) the only answer is to supply poor countries with the knowledge to produce enough of their own food. Th at in turn may entail their going (or being driven) down the modern, unsustainable, intensive agriculture route.

Modern high-tech agriculture, and indeed most of the human population, are completely reliant on the use of fertilisers to achieve high yields of food and feed crops. However the world currently uses about 200 million tonnes of mineral fertilisers a year to grow these crops (Heff er and Prud’homme 2014 ). It is probable that around three quarters of this enormous quantity of nutrients is lost, either on farm (where it can leach into groundwater, evaporate into the atmosphere, become locked in the soil or nourish unwanted weeds), or else in the form of post-harvest crop losses, food waste and discharged sewage. Attempts to double global food production by conventional farming 7 The Devourer (Homo devorans) 131 methods also imply a probable doubling in global rates of fertiliser use, notably in Asia and Africa where soils are seriously impoverished from long cultivation. At the same time many of the world’s high grade phosphate and potash reserves are running down, with those of phosphorus—an element indispensable to all life on Earth—expected to become depleted within about 50 years (Gilbert 2009 ; Pearce 2011 ). Th e problem is compounded by the fact that most remaining phosphate reserves are hard rock, which requires vastly more fossil energy to mine. While nitrogen for nitrogenous fertilisers is abundant in the atmosphere, producing them depends on natural gas which is a greenhouse gas and will also become scarce by mid- century. All this will drive up the price of synthetic fertilisers to unaff ordable levels for most farmers, especially in the developing world. Th is in turn spells reduced farm production at a time of increased demand—and consequently shortages and much higher food prices for consumers .

Heavy use of nitrogen-phosphorus-potash (NPK) fertilisers over the past century has had another pernicious side-eff ect, the depletion of the world’s best arable soils of the micro- nutrients vital to health and life. When you over-boost crop plant growth with these fertilisers, the plants in turn ‘mine’ the soil of these minor but essential elements, which are not being replaced. For example, a US study indicates we now have to eat fi ve tomatoes or caulifl owers to get the same essential minerals as our grandparents, a hundred years ago, gained from eating just one (Marler and Wallin 2006 ). Scientists also suspect that this decline in ‘nutrient density’ in the modern diet may be a factor in the rising global incidence of chronic diet-related diseases.

All of this creates the potential for a nutrient crisis in the mid-century if the current approach of mining the Earth’s soils and minerals continues, since all mines eventually run out. Th e solution is for the world to urgently recycle all our waste nutrients—crop wastes, food waste, postharvest losses, sewage, forestry and garden clippings and so on, back into food production. However, this will require every city and town to outlaw the disposal of food and other organic waste in landfills, to mandate its recycling into fertilisers, soil improvers, composts and other products, and to create local processing centres to do this. It will also require the development of urban agriculture on a global scale, to take advantage of the vast quantities of nutrients concentrated in the big cities.

Energy Risks

Oil is the lifeblood of modern mechanised farming. Just to feed ourselves means we each ‘eat’ the diesel fuel component of 66 barrels of oil a year—or about 1.3 l of diesel for every meal served. Oil is required to plant, irrigate, 132 Surviving the 21st Century harvest, store, transport, process and deliver our food—typically half the oil is used on farm and half beyond the farm gate. Overall, food production accounts for around 30 % of the world’s total energy use (UN FAO 2014a ).

Put simply, for most of humanity: no oil, no food.

Future oil shocks thus represent one of the gravest and most immediate risks to the global food supply, especially in developed countries and megacities. Th ese may arise as a result of gradual depletion of the world’s easily-accessible fossil oil reserves—known as Peak Oil—or as a result of wars and governance failures in key producing regions, or local disasters. Peak Oil occurs when an oilfi eld passes the high point in the extraction of its resource and production begins to taper off : this has happened many times for individual oil fi elds around the world and is now happening in major oil provinces such as Saudi Arabia (Patterson 2014 ). Recent discoveries, such as in the Arctic, from unconventional sources like tar sands and shale oil, and from deepwater drilling have led some experts to conclude “Th e world is not running out of oil itself, but rather its ability to produce high-quality cheap and economically extractable oil on demand” (Kuhlman 2015 ). However, many of the alternatives to petroleum, such as tar sands or crop ethanol are far less energy effi cient and may not be able to sustain modern industrial civilisation.

A major issue, and one which has largely escaped the attention of governments and experts, is that world production of new cars in the early 2010s grew several times faster than the volume of new oil being discovered, from all sources, conventional and unconventional (International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA) 2013 ; US Energy Information Administration 2013 ). Such excessive growth in potential demand for oil relative to supply, if maintained, creates a risk of future oil shocks. With many of the world’s farmers, especially in Asia and Africa, still in transition from manual to mechanical farming systems, both they as well as farmers in traditional western farming systems are highly vulnerable to oil scarcity or high prices. Globally, the corporatized food chain with its just-in-time approach to food distribution, is totally oil-dependent and highly susceptible to major fl uctuations in oil price or supply. Governments, as a rule, have done little to insure against this, meaning that in the twenty-fi rst century a global oil crisis may quickly explode into a global food crisis.

A fundamental paradox of energy-intensive agriculture is that the more oil it burns and land it clears, the more greenhouse gases it emits—and the less reliable this makes the very climate on which food growing depends. Th e present oil-based food system is thus sowing the seeds of its own potential destruction. If humanity is to avoid famine in the mid-century, it has to change . 7 The Devourer (Homo devorans) 133 Th e solution to this problem is to rapidly wean the food industry worldwide from its addiction to fossil fuels. One way to do this is to develop renewable liquid fuels, but in forms which do not compete with agriculture for land, water, energy or fertiliser . Th is promising alternative is explored below.

Urban HungerTraps?

By 2050 the world’s cities will be home to more than 7 billion inhabitants (WHO 2014 ) and cover an area of the world’s best farming soils equivalent to the size of China. Th ese gigantic cities have one terrible fl aw: they cannot feed themselves. Th ey rely on a river of trucks, planes or ships coming daily to restock the shops and markets. Much of their food travels from thousands of kilometres away, sometimes the other side of the planet. Any break in the fl ow—an oil crisis, a war, even a major fl ood or storm—and a megacity would starve within days. Th at food supplies might fail is something that has escaped most modern urban planners. Recent experience of events such as cyclone Haiyan in the Philippines, Hurricane Sandy in the US and the Bangkok fl oods of 2011 indicates that panic-buying by the local populace can strip shops of all food within 24–48 h. While most cities have emergency measures for natural disasters such as fl ood, fi re, storm, earthquake or disease outbreak, few are equipped to survive a food emergency and most would depend entirely on outside aid.

Food, water and energy crises now constitute a major interwoven threat to the Earth’s most densely-inhabited regions. While not jeopardising civilization as a whole, any megacity collapse would inevitably send shockwaves round the planet in the form of refugees, soaring food prices, shortages and economic impacts. If our current unpreparedness persists, the world is likely to witness several of these events in coming decades.

An emerging issue is the poor nutritional quality of the diet for many urban dwellers, especially those on middle and low incomes. This is the result of the industrialisation of food in the global food chain, the use of thousands of chemicals in processing and packaging it and the replacement of fresh food with highly-processed or fast food in many people’s diets, heavy in salt/sugar/ fat but devoid of vitamins and essential minerals and micronutrients. Th is has created of ‘food deserts’ even in relatively affl uent cities and new forms of malnutrition, including obesity and diabetes in both developed and developing countries. (American Nutrition Association 2010 ) 134 Surviving the 21st Century

The solution to all these problems is for cities to grow far more of their own food, fresh and locally, using advanced urban farming systems, discussed below, and by recycling all of their water and nutrients back into food production. (Cribb 2011 )

Fishery Failure

The world wild fish catch peaked in 1994 and has been stagnant or declining ever since (UN FAO 2014b ). Indeed, recent research indicates that the collapse in sea fisheries has been steeper, even, than the UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates and has been shrinking at around a million tonnes per year (Pauly and Zeller 2016 )—bad tidings for cats and seafood lovers alike. Despite progress in developing sustainable fisheries by a handful of countries, the take-home message is that the world is not going to double its harvest of wild protein from the oceans at the same time as food demand doubles. In fact, with 90 % of world fi sheries rated as fully- or over-exploited, we will be lucky even to maintain the average catch of 80 million tonnes of wild fi sh. At the same time the problems of overharvesting are being compounded by the spread of ocean and coastal ‘dead zones’ (Chap. 3) where fi sh cannot survive, and by the growing fl ood of toxic chemicals, plastics and heavy metals (Chap. 6) which we release into the oceans and much of which ends up in the fish we eat.

Recent decades have witnessed spectacular growth in aquaculture, with the world fi sh and water plant harvest attaining 67 million tonnes a year by the mid-2010s. However, this highly promising industry is held back by the availability of protein and nutrient sources to feed to farmed fi sh. Supplies of ‘trash fi sh’ are now more often used as human food due to the scarcity of table species, while feeding a huge new global aquaculture industry on grain will only apply greater pressure to world grain supplies both for humans and for livestock like cattle, pigs and poultry. Furthermore, feeding grain to fi sh increases soil degradation and competes with other farm industries for energy and fertiliser. Th ese factors present a major obstacle to the world farmed fi sh industry developing to anything like its true potential, which is probably in the vicinity of 200 million tonnes. If this ‘feed barrier’ can be overcome then farmed fi sh can easily become humanity’s main protein staple by mid-century, surpassing all other meats and poultry.

The solution to this problem lies in the oceans themselves, as we discuss below.

Knowledge Drought

Having given birth to the immensely successful Green Revolution which doubled world food production, the world scientific effort in food and agriculture has been quietly stagnating ever since (Alston et al. 2009 ). Of the $1+ trillion invested globally in scientific research and development today, it is estimated that less than 5 % is devoted to improving agriculture or food production. Since the human population has doubled since the 1970s while food research has declined in real terms, this means we have more than halved the brainpower which humanity puts into securing and improving the food supply. This scientific stagnation has resulted in a worldwide plateauing, in some cases actual declines, in rates of crop yield gains (Grassini et al. 2013 ). Food production, in short, is no longer keeping pace with demand over the long haul, which is a very dangerous trend.

The biggest declines have taken place in public sector agricultural research in the developed countries—Europe, America, Australia, even China. To some extent this has been off set by growth in the private sector. However, this development tends to favour technologies profitable to the shareholders of the technology companies, rather than technologies desired by consumers, or essential to sustainable farming, to human health or to the environment. Technologies such as genetic modification of food while promising much, have yet to deliver substantial food increases to the world’s table, but in the meantime have attracted public investment away from critical areas such as soil science, soil microbiology, agronomy, entomology and traditional plant breeding. Furthermore, the growing rejection of GMO food by many consumers in Europe, Asia, Australasia and the Americas suggests that over- backing of a single technology may prove a strategic error and misinvestment, in the context of a weakening world food science eff ort.

The solution is for the world to redouble public investment in agricultural and food science and try to make up lost ground. Since there is strong evidence that well-fed countries suffer fewer wars whereas hungry ones suffer more wars (See for example De Soya and Gleditsch 1999 ; Carter 1999b ), the best way to fund this would be to cut world arms budgets by 10 % and invest the savings in food science (Cribb 2011 ). This will yield a double ‘peace dividend’—by reducing the amount of weaponry in circulation and by reducing the likelihood of wars in regions afflicted by food, land and water scarcity.

Killer Diets

The modern diet is neither safe nor healthy: medical scientists estimate that today two out of every three people in the world die from a diet-related disease (WHO 2014 ). In affl uent societies over three quarters of the population now ‘die by their own hand’—the one holding the fork or chopsticks—and the lion’s share of their citizens’ taxation is now spent on often-unsuccessful attempts by the healthcare system to cure the incurable with drugs etc.

Put simply: the world diet has to change—to one that is fresh, diverse, healthy and which prevents disease instead of causing it. Driven by consumers ardent for better health, by farmers seeking improved incomes from highquality fresh produce and by a growing army of healthcare professionals who have seen what is happening before their very eyes in hospitals and hospices across the world, food is heading for a new revolution—as a potential lifesaver for billions.

The factors killing the world’s people are the same as those killing its soils and waters: over-industrialisation of the global food chain and the very low prices it pays to farmers. Th e University of Sydney’s John Crawford explains:

The connection with health is significant. Cheap food tends to be low in protein and high in carbohydrate, which is exactly the wrong balance for a healthy society. By reducing food to a mere commodity, we have created a system that is degrading the global capacity to continue to produce food, and is fuelling a global epidemic of diabetes and related chronic disease. Obesity in the US cost 150 billion dollars – 20 % of the health budget – in 2008, the latest fi gures available, and this huge cost will rise as the broken food system takes its toll (Crawford 2012 )

Cheap food also contains traces of biocides: in the US, for example, some 6000 different chemicals are used to grow, process, preserve, extend, flavour, decorate and package food. Their combined health impact on the consumer is unknown, but since many of these substances are known toxins, carcinogens and endocrine disruptors, medical studies reporting probable health impacts are multiplying. Cheap food is also nowadays often imported from developing countries, where regulatory standards and hygiene are low, corruption is rife, pollution widespread, farmers inexperienced in chemical use and farming systems are under the thumb of avaricious food corporates. Due to globalised supermarket chains and food fi rms, this unhealthy food is now on everyone’s platter.

The answer is straightforward, and is up to us as consumers: eat local, eat fresh, eat sustainably—and be willing to reward our own farmers much better for their care and professionalism in delivering safe, fresh, uncontaminated food of high nutritional quality.

Or else, put simply: save at the supermarket, spend at the hospice .

Climate Shock

Outside of a nuclear war or asteroid collision, the biggest shock in store for the human population in the 21st Century will be the impact of climate change on the food supply.

The Holocene climate which gave birth to agriculture some 6000–8000 years ago is now extinct (Rahmstorf 2013 ). It will not return: the world has changed. Two degrees of global warming—now probably unavoidable—will make harvests unreliable in most of the world’s great grain bowls. In India, for example, grain yields may fall by as much as 45 % (See for example Th e World Bank 2013 ). Numerous scientific estimates indicate that, without adaptation, 5° of warming could halve global food production—at the very time we need it to double. The staple American crops, corn and soybeans, for example, are predicted to suffer yield losses of between 63 and 82 % (Schlenker and Roberts 2009). The sea level rise which warming causes will inundate most of the world’s low-lying river delta regions—themselves major foodbowls. By 2030, 54 million people will be driven from their homes each year by floods, a 150 % increase on present levels (Lehman 2015 ).

The impact of climate on food is already being felt. Th e IPCC’s 5th Assessment notes: “Based on many studies covering a wide range of regions and crops, negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (high confidence).” What this means for future food security is serious: one international scientific study finds that every 1° increase in local temperature results in a 6 % decline in wheat yields (Asseng et al. 2014 ). If wheat crops are not specially adapted to these higher temperatures, it means the world’s bread supply could shrink by as much as a third at the very time it needs to double (Natural Resources Institute of Finland 2015 ). If the climate warms by 4°–5°, then crop yields will need to double to off set climate losses, then double again to meet human demands. The sheer magnitude of this challenge is widely ignored by agricultural policy experts, who are wedded to ancient production systems. It signifies that traditional farming is not the way we will mainly feed humanity in a hotter, resource- depleted world.

This dilemma will affect everyone on Earth, if not with actual starvation then at the very least in terms of the price, availability and nutritiousness of food. It will become a principal driver of geopolitics, warfare, migration, pandemic disease and refugee tsunamis for much of the century. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned, some of these wars could go nuclear (Campell et al. 2007 ).

The solution to this quandary is for humanity to rely far less on the traditional European grain-and-meat diet, which requires a cool, stable climate— and more on a lighter, healthier Asian-style fish-and-vegetable diet utilising novel highly-intensive and indoor systems which are resilient to climate impacts, or else unaffected by them.

This isn’t simply a change of diet or a food fashion. On this transition rests the future of civilisation.

#### The alternative alone solves the aff better- black foodways have always been a way to access self-determination in the face racial capitalist power structures.

**McClintock 18** [Nathan McClintock, Professor at Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, May 22, 2018, “Urban agriculture, racial capitalism, and resistance in the settler-colonial city”, Wiley Online Library, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gec3.12373?casa_token=v-oWijW4HMgAAAAA%3AuCrVmoalxNdvNZ7QhGTAKebNuh5nBESgnZ91qHVKn6zoOZeBi-sbGJRS6ZUgu4xhlQs6AK_yJRcbACUU>, JMH]

Through these lenses, understanding UA as a form of resistance and self-determination under racial capitalism/settler colonialism first demands attention to “banal acts of daily subsistence” as these “reflect and reproduce capitalist social relations, express their contradictions, and contain the seeds of their overcoming” (Figueroa, 2015, p. 502). **Urban food production has historically served as a means of subsistence for low-income, racialized, and marginalized populations, supplementing diets and providing agriculturalists with supplemental income from sales of garden surplus.** Often arriving in cities and towns from rural areas, people with limited incomes grew food to lower grocery costs and earn a little money on the side (McClintock, 2010; Nicolaides, 2001); indeed, in many cities, agriculture and truck farming was often one of the few activities open to racialized immigrants (Gibb & Wittman, 2013; Lim, 2015; Wong, 2004, pp. 211–220). For African Americans who moved from the U.S. South to urban centers in the North and West during the two Great Migrations, growing staple vegetables such as okra, collards, and sweet potatoes and raising small livestock was a means of saving money, supplementing incomes, and having fresh produce in the summer and canned surplus for the winter (Wiese, 2005, p. 78). Later waves of immigration to U.S. cities similarly saw newcomers growing food at home and in community gardens (Airriess & Clawson, 1994; Baker, 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2014; Martinez, 2010; Saldivar-Tanaka & Krasny, 2004). For many immigrants, urban gardening provides “biographical continuity” (Li, Hodgetts, & Ho, 2010, p. 786) between their old lives in their country of origin and their lives in a new culture and space (Irazábal & Punja, 2009; Mares & Peña, 2010). Gardens also provided sustenance for many Indigenous people forcefully relocated to large cities in the 1950s and 1960s (Pollak, 2016, p. 94). Food production has thus served as a buffer against economic upheaval inherent to the socio-spatial logic of uneven capitalist development (McClintock, 2010; Sbicca, 2014; Tornaghi, 2014), providing a modicum of food security, supplementing diets with fresh produce, and providing benefits to mental and physical health (Gray, Guzman, Glowa, & Drevno, 2014; Hale et al., 2011; Kortright & Wakefield, 2011). **Urban food production has similarly contributed to Black self-determination.** Indeed, foodways have long played an important role in emancipatory politics in African American communities—from the agricultural and culinary knowledge of enslaved people (Carney, 2009; Wisecup, 2015) to the anti-hunger work of the Black Panther Party (Heynen, 2009b)—and have been a site of negotiation between divergent Black political ideologies (McCutcheon, 2015), from which theories of praxis emerge that link analysis of racial capitalist structures and relations to the “deeply human side” of everyday survival (Heynen, 2009a, p. 197). Black gardening is thus “a way to stake a claim to permanency, education, economic citizenship, and community leadership, rather than only as a vehicle for food security” (Tuck, Smith, Guess, Benjamin, & Jones, 2014, p. 55). Examining urban gardens in a majority African American area of Washington, DC, Reese (2018, p. 421) explains how gardeners draw on “memories and myths” of a hyper-local Black economy that arose in response to redlining and segregation. These affective stories served as “both a critique of the breakdown of Black community life and as inspiration for reclaiming a past of cooperative living that was seemingly lost.” Indeed, gifting, sharing, and trading garden produce between Black gardeners has traditionally “reinforced community bonds and preserved tangible links” (Wiese, 2005, p. 85) not only to an African American agrarian heritage in the South but also to Black liberation struggles and the Blues development tradition, more broadly (Figueroa, 2015; Heynen, 2009b; McCutcheon, 2013; Ramírez, 2015; Rickford, 2017; White, 2011b). Echoing other studies of UA in Detroit (Pothukuchi, 2015; White, 2011b, 2011a), Safransky (2017, p. 1093) describes how for some Black farmers, UA is “a strategy of resistance, an act of self-determination, a challenge to systemic violence” that contributes to wider efforts “to undo colonial spatial orders and structures of white supremacy,” an observation that appears to be true of Black UA efforts across the country: New York (Reynolds & Cohen, 2016; Sbicca & Myers, 2017); Chicago (Block, Chávez, Allen, & Ramirez, 2012; Shabazz, 2015, pp. 115–118); Los Angeles (Bonacich & Alimahomed-Wilson, 2011; Broad, 2016); the Bay Area (Bradley & Galt, 2014; Sbicca, 2016); and many other American cities (Passidomo, 2016; Ramírez, 2015; Rodriguez, 2017). As the literature cited in this article illustrates, UA can serve as both a tool of racial Othering and dispossession and a tool of resistance to these same processes and their outcomes. Urban agriculture is not inherently one way or another—it is simply an everyday practice. How it is mobilized and by whom, however, can make all the difference in whether it serves to bolster racial capitalism or to undermine it. Viewing UA through a relational framework of racial capitalism and settler colonialism can help clarify some of its contradictory outcomes. Future theoretical and empirical work in this vein might address any number of scales, from ethnographies focused on the micro-geographies of everyday UA practices, to macro-scale relational comparative work. A few additional recommendations for future work are worth mentioning. First, regardless of the scale or scope of analysis, scholars should work hard to identify which specific processes are at play in a given case, to clarify precisely how racial Othering and settler logics of erasure and dispossession mediate particular political economic processes (see, for example, Coulthard, 2014; Day, 2016; King, 2016; Pasternak & Dafnos, 2017). Second, future work should place gender more centrally, given the gendered dynamics of UA and social reproduction, more broadly. Third, while some have called for more attention to UA practiced by people of color (to offset the disproportionate attention paid to the urban farming of young, White hipsters; see Reynolds & Cohen, 2016, for example), scholars should take care to avoid essentializing the UA practices of Indigenous people and people of color. Fostering and protecting spaces for people to tell their own stories is one important way to uphold the diversity of epistemologies and narratives. Finally, future work might even call into question using UA as a framework of analysis in and of itself. Given that hunting, fishing, and gathering of foods are all central to Indigenous food sovereignty and resurgence (Daigle, 2017; Poe, LeCompte, McLain, & Hurley, 2014; Simpson & Bagelman, 2018), we might ask whether a narrow, Eurocentric focus on cultivation, as opposed to a more broadly defined food system, works to erase non-White epistemologies and practices. In sum, given the extent to which discursive Othering and erasure undergird racial capitalism, how we frame UA and other food spaces—and, indeed, what we choose to focus our research on—clearly matters.

#### We straight turn reformism.

Kelley, 15—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Beyond Black Lives Matter,” Kalfou, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, (Fall 2015): 330-337, dml)

This implicit appeal to acknowledge us-to recognize our humanity, our dignity, and our right to live-is understandable in a world where the statesanctioned killing and caging of Black bodies is routine. But as George Lipsitz observed, such appeals are embedded in a humanist logic that emphasizes "interiority" and feeling, thereby elevating "the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice."7 That is to say, our feelings of empathy in any representation of suffering are designed to be understood and individually felt rather than transformed into collective praxis. This is partly why concepts like reparations are so antithetical to modern liberalism. Given the trauma produced by an endless video loop of Black people dying at the hands of police officers who are almost never indicted, let alone prosecuted and convicted, collective healing and the cultivation of sympathy are to be expected. On one hand, this makes the movement's counterslogan, "All Lives Matter," all the more offensive and painful. "All Lives Matter" is heard and felt as a belittling or decentering of anti-Black racism. It trades on postracial myths of equivalency in suffering. On the other hand, sometimes we react to "All Lives Matter" with such hostility that it stands in as an unambiguous expression of anti-Black racism. Can we salvage these words? Don't we want to build a world in which every life is valuable, cherished, and sustained? Are we not seeking a world that recognizes multiple sites of dispossession and recognizes that state violence inside US borders is inseparable from US militarism around the world? The fact that we are compelled to a defensive position is a consequence of focusing on proving our value rather than critiquing the system that devalues all of us and destroys the world in the process.

The veracity of our humanity was never the issue-then or now. The problem lies with Western civilization's very construction of the human. As Sylvia Wynter, Cedric Robinson, Aimé Césaire and others have been saying for decades, the "Negro" was an invention, a fiction-like that of the Indian, the Oriental, the "Mexican," etc. Or in Frantz Fanon's oft-quoted line from The Wretched of the Earth: "It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject."8 Indeed, the entire structure of global white supremacy depends on such inventions, like the fictions of the Arab as non- or anti-Western and the "Immigrant" as essentially Latino/a, or the notion that indigenous people (in North America at least) are all dead. This is why we have such a hard time acknowledging that most so-called immigrants from Mexico and Central America are, in fact, indigenous.

The very foundations of Western civilization were built on such fabrications and enacted through violence. Once they crumble, so goes Western civilization's conceit as well as the massive philosophical smokescreen that enables (racial) capitalism-the greatest, most destructive, most violent crime wave in history-to masquerade as the engine of progress, a pure expression of freedom and liberty, the only path to human emancipation. The modern world that invented the Negro, the Oriental, the Indian, and the Savage as a means of inventing European Man was built on the theft of humans, theft of land and water, indiscriminate murder, violation of customary rights, moral economy, enclosure of the commons, destruction of the planet-outright lawlessness, justified by supposed rationality or what Weber might call instrumental rationality. To leave it at Black Lives Matter unintentionally conceals the crime. After all, these were the very processes that birthed the liberal humanism to which BLM activists seem to appeal.

In his book Forgeries of Memory and Meaning, Cedric Robinson further elaborates on the systems of racial maintenance and myth making, the "racial regimes" responsible for the inventions of the Negro (the Indian, the Oriental) and their relation to capital. What exactly are racial regimes? In Robinson's words, they "are constructed social systems in which race is proposed as a justification for the relations of power." The power is real and formidable but surprisingly unstable. For Robinson, "the covering conceit of a racial regime is a makeshift patchwork masquerading as memory and the immutable. Nevertheless, racial regimes do possess history, that is, discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unrelentingly hostile to their exhibition."9 In other words, to say that anti-Blackness is foundational to Western civilization is not to say that it is fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is incredibly fragile and must be constantly remade; it is epiphenomenal to the production of Blackness-which is an essential component of modern racial regimes, but not its totality. In the last century alone, racial regimes have been remade, reconfigured, destabilized, and consolidated many times, employing new technologies to circulate old racial fabulations and new fictions in the process of capitalist expansion.

Proving one's humanity will not uproot racial regimes, for the very evidence of our humanity is their raison d'etre. Our exploitation is evidence of our value, but it requires enormous intellectual, juridical, and psychic resources to conceal our humanity. Slavery was not just social death, but was based on a cost-benefit analysis that assumed the disposability of Black lives. The system of extracting surplus emerged within a logic of racial hierarchy and racial subjugation that dragged Africans, Asians, and Europeans proletarianized by enclosure to the lands of the Americas, Oceania, parts of South Asia and Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean-where indigenous people were dispossessed, enslaved, or exploited by other means. Enclosure is yet another example of theft and violence masking as "law, order, security": backed by the rule of law, the state employs violence to discipline, to reclassify, to criminalize, and to destroy sovereignty and create disorder. Enclosure is part of this process of war-a war on the commons, which ultimately turns some of the expropriated people into a proletariat (including European industrial, maritime, and landless rural labor, as well as prostitutes and beggars), turns a portion into settlers, and sends a portion to the workhouse. Some are merely casualties whose flesh mingles with the earth and whose bodies-sometimes hanging from a tree or broken on the wheel-serve to terrorize those who resist the new discipline.10

While the value of Black labor may have ebbed and flowed with the changing character of the global economy, there has never been a moment in US history when our humanity mattered, when Black people could enjoy full privileges and protections of citizenship. But the same can be said of most of the planet-at least until the mid-twentieth century, although I would venture to say this is still the case. What Black resistance calls into question is the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of those who subjugate in the name of civilization; it insists that the survival of humanity (and this is not the humanity defined by the Enlightenment) depends on the complete destruction of racial capitalism, patriarchy, and regimes of normativity.

As I wrote in the aftermath of the George Zimmerman verdict, unless we come to terms with this history, we will continue to believe that the system just needs to be tweaked, or the right-wing fringe defeated, or our humanity acknowledged.11 We will miss the routine character of state violence; its origins in the very formation of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism; and the ways in which routine violence has become a central component of US policies, including drone warfare and targeted killing. We cannot change the situation simply by finding the right legal strategy, the best policies, or recognition.

#### Lesion, pharmacological, and deep brain stimulation studies provide empirical neurological support for psychoanalysis

Dall’Aglio 19 [John Dall’Aglio, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University. Developmental Psychosomatics Laboratory, New York State Psychiatric Institute/Columbia University Medical Center.] “Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-neuropsychology” Neuropsychoanalysis, Vol. 21, 2019 (<https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1619091>) – MZhu

Affective consciousness and the real

Recall the concept of the real as a negativity (non-representational insistence) which is present from the beginning. Das Ding emerges simultaneously with understanding yet is outside of it (Freud, 1895). Reason (or cognition, understood as a symbolic-imaginary function) cannot represent, and thereby cannot comprehend, the real. In this way, the limit of reason is within reason (Copjec, 2012; Laplanche, 2011).

Therefore, neural areas corresponding to the real should be constitutive of, but not identical with, cognitive functions. As non-representational, they should insist their presence through affect and the compulsive repetition of the drive. At the core of the subject, the real is also at the core of cognition, while simultaneously the limit of that cognition.

The drive (iteration, source/pressure) refers to the real (Johnston, 2013). Freud (1915a) defined drive as:

a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body. (Freud, 1915a, pp. 121–122)

Drive, thereby, refers to the demand upon the mind concerning bodily needs. In the brain, the brainstem and diencephalon contain “need-detectors.” Each has a homeostatic set-point – for example, the ideal amount of salt to have in the blood. The hypothalamus and related systems closely monitor and modulate the internal body (see, for example, Waterson & Horvath, 2015; Williams, Harrold & Cutler, 2000; Woods, Seely, Prote, & Schwartz, 1993). These areas can be dynamically localized as important points of proximity between the body and the mind, and the locus of the pressure of the drive (Solms, 2013).

These diencephalic and upper brainstem systems are fundamentally affective (Panksepp, 1998; Solms, 2013). Deviations from set-points produce unpleasure, whereas moving towards the set-point generates pleasure. One major structure is the periaqueductal gray (PAG), which receives projections from these brainstem areas. Stimulation of the ventral columns of the PAG induces feelings of extreme pleasure, whereas stimulation of the dorsal columns corresponds to feelings of excruciating pain. Here, one finds the pleasure principle as a key dynamic in the process of maintaining homeostasis (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

Importantly, this affective system is fundamental to consciousness, the feeling state of being. Disturbances to upper areas of the brain disrupt cognitive and emotional functions, but the subject retains affective being (Penfield & Jasper, 1954). For example, hydranencephalic patients are born with little-to-no cortex but intact subcortical affective circuits (Merker, 2007; Shewmon, Holmes, & Byrne, 1999). These patients are still conscious in the affective sense and respond to the environment through these circuits. Summarizing these various lines of evidence, Solms (2013) argues that consciousness can exist without cortex.

However, damage to these affective circuits significantly impairs consciousness (along with cognition). In fact, a lesion to the PAG completely wipes out consciousness, extinguishing affective being. This supports the critical role of the upper brainstem in the generation of consciousness (Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949), which leads Solms (2013) to conclude that affective consciousness is the bedrock of consciousness. Later cognitive functions of the cortex depend upon and are shaped by the affective circuits which function prior to them (Panksepp, 1998; Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

With its (extimate) relationship with the internal body via homeostasis and drives, the upper brainstem and associated structures correspond functionally to Freud’s id. In contrast, the cortical focus on exteroception corresponds to Freud’s ego. Since the upper brainstem is intrinsically conscious (i.e. its activity generates the affective bedrock of consciousness) and the cortex is dependent on the brainstem for consciousness, Solms (2013) argues that the id is fundamentally conscious. Rather than the nucleus of the unconscious, the id is the font of consciousness.

More specifically, the id (upper brainstem and associated structures) is affectively conscious. It generates being as a feeling state without representation. Through a Lacanian lens, this affective consciousness corresponds to the insistence of the real. It is non-representational, a primary affect (Lacan, 1997). It is beyond (indeed, prior to) cognition – constituting a limit, an impasse. Furthermore, as the bedrock of consciousness, it is constitutive of cognition. This fits well within Lacan’s conception of the real and the drive (Johnston, 2013a).

Affective instincts

Additionally, affective consciousness extends into the limbic system. Panksepp (1998) identifies seven affective systems: SEEKING, RAGE, PANIC, PLAY, CARE, LUST, and FEAR.7 Across mammals, they exhibit the same circuitry, neurotransmitters, and stereotyped motor functions (see Panksepp, 1998 for neuroanatomical details). A combination of lesion, pharmacological, and deep brain stimulation studies supports the dynamic localization of their functions.

SEEKING closely resembles the Freudian libidinal drive (Solms, 2012a). It is an objectless, volitional system that carries its own subjective quality of excitatory pleasure (as opposed to a reduction of tension). The rest of the circuits are more specialized. For example, RAGE characterizes the aggressive impulse to destroy that which frustrates the subject’s goals. PANIC activates in response to separation from a loved object, connoting separation-anxiety. Generally speaking, all seven systems generate a distinct response to an experience of the external world.

Furthermore, these experiences also concern socio-emotional needs, such as attachment needs in the PANIC system (Solms, 2012b). These limbic circuits qualitatively elaborate upper brainstem affective consciousness through distinct socio-emotional needs. These affective instincts prepare the organism to interact with the world and meet its needs, albeit in a rough-and-ready way (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

Insofar as these affective instincts are prepared for certain types of experiences, I would suggest that they are not the real proper and are better localized at the intersection of the real and the imaginary. Nevertheless, they also have built in “holes” – the potential to acquire new objects. For example, the FEAR system has certain built-in objects (such as a fear of falling). However, it also has the potential to learn new objects, such as electrical outlets. This potential is never exhausted, for these areas are subject to neuroplasticity (Ansermet & Magistretti, 2007; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). I suggest that these seven affective instincts might be considered “highways” from the real to the symbolic-imaginary. Similarly, Verhaeghe (2004) highlights Panksepp’s (1998) instincts as potential neurobiological underpinnings in the child’s turn to the Other (symbolic-imaginary registers) to answer the pressure of the drive (the real).

These instincts contrast with the upper brainstem homeostatic drives. Each instinct represents a socio-emotional need. In the perspective of drive as representative of bodily need (i.e. located in brainstem and diencephalon “need-detectors”), there is not much flexibility in terms of what objects might satisfy the drive. Only water can satisfy the demand made upon the mind when dehydrated, for example. However, affective instincts are more flexible – emotional needs may find any number of objects.

Therefore, the flexibility attributed to the psychoanalytic drive (i.e. alteration, the aim and object) corresponds with the plasticity and potentiality of these affective instincts. In contrast, the brainstem, corresponds to the real of the drive (i.e. iteration, the source and pressure). Indeed, drive itself is split – here, neuro-structurally and evolutionarily, for the affective instincts are more evolutionarily recent than the upper brainstem (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). For Lacan, the tension of the drive is never eliminated. SEEKING corresponds best to this notion of excitatory pleasure in the drive, for it is innately objectless (Solms, 2012a). However, this inexhaustibility may be attributed to all seven affective instincts.

#### Libidinal economy is true

Chico et al 11 (A Primer on "Libidinal Economy" in Relation to Black Folks. Cosmic Hoboes: An Afropessimist Meditation (No)Space. <https://cosmichoboes.blogspot.com/2011/08/primer-on-libidinal-economy-in-relation.html>)

People who are interested in struggle need to understand the "libidinal economy." Coalition politicos like Al Sharpton like to tell us to put the unique experiences of black folks in the backseat to the interests of poor folks more generally. Such politicians expect us to submerge our interests as black people on the assumption that if poor people in general benefit from a political concession, poor black people will share equally in such benefits. Such politicos will continue to ignore the repeated evidence that a lot of nonblack people hate black people, even if doing so costs them money. If someone tells you that the problems black folks face are really just the problems that poor people face, they are telling you to ignore the libidinal economy. They are telling you that the political economy of capitalism is more important than the libidinal economy of antiblack racism. What is "libidinal economy"? In Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010, Duke University Press), black political theorist Frank Wilderson highlights the distinction between political economy and libidinal economy (p. 9): Jared Sexton describes libidinal economy as “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious.” Needless to say, libidinal economy functions variously across scales and is as “objective” as political economy. Importantly, it is linked not only to forms of attraction, affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence of lethal consumption. He emphasizes that it is “the whole structure of psychic and emotional life,” something more than, but inclusive of or traversed by, what Gramsci and other marxists call a “structure of feeling”; it is “a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.” What does all this mean? Let's interpret this elaborate definition and get to how it thinks of "economy." When we think of economy, we usually think of something having to do with money. Wilderson uses the term political economy to refer to economy in the ways that we usually think of it: the ways people exchange materials and decide on how things are valued. Economy doesn't just mean the economy in the sense of the stock market or banks, but also any means of determining whether something is worth doing or possessing based on how much capital and labor power it yields. In struggle, we see over and over that money talks and bullshit walks. Economy has to do with what they value moves people to act. Economies are therefore very important to political action. But can there be an economy that exchanges something other than money or capital? Yes. To understand "economy" as Wilderson and Sexton use it, we have to think of economy in a more general way as things of all kinds that we can trade or save. You can accumulate not only cash or material items, but also fears and desires. Certain people accumulate more fear (the black athlete) and desire (the blonde cheerleader) than others. The term libidinal economy refers to the systems of exchange and valuation for fantasies, desires, fears, aversions, and enjoyment. Economy is about exchange and accumulation. Everyone feels fear and aggression, but where is it directed? The libidinal is about both people's desires, fantasies, and pleasures AND their phobias, fears, and violent consumptions. A libidinal economy has to do with which groups a subject is attracted to, which groups it is willing to form alliances with, and which people it is willing to provide affection to. Where can we see this libidinal economy? How can we illustrate this distinction? The libido is the collection of things like phobias and desires that are unconscious and invisible but that have a visible effect on the world, including the money economy. Some examples: We see libidinal economies at work any time there is a response by state that is out of all proportion to the material effects of any practice they are regulating. The USA incarcerates three million people, despite the fact that doing so has an adverse impact on US financial security. Hence the libidinal economy of the fear of black and brown people (who together comprise the overwhelming majority of inmates) trumps the political economy of the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining prisons. Let's take another example of the powder - versus crack-cocaine distinction, in which the same drug is punished differently at the federal level. Because the two drugs are chemically identical, there shouldn't be any distinction between how their use and sale is punished. In 2010, the law made it so that these two drugs were punished the same, although the Obama administration isn't in any hurry to make the abolition of this distinction retroactive so that the mostly black and brown people who are locked up because of it will get released. But the legal abolition of this distinction is not essential for us to look at. What is essential is why that distinction was made in the first place. Wilderson's work suggests that, for civil society, black people pose a threat that has nothing to do with the chemical content or the social and cultural effects of crack. Simply by being associated with black people, crack is seen as 100 times more threatening than is powder cocaine. The financial and social costs of locking all those black and brown people up and the financial and social costs of allowing all those white people to go free and continue to sell does not really matter to civil society. What the powder- versus crack-cocaine distinction shows is the desire to contain the threat that blackness symbolizes. This is the mark of libidinal economy. Cops, soldiers, firemen are considered sexually desirable because they become the heroes of civil society. The Oscar Grant shooting. Amadou Diallo was a victim of a extreme kind of violence because of the phobias that converged on his body. What is the exchange? Civil society has an anxiety about crime, and crime is always attached to black in urban areas. Police don't have to get a monetary award, but they get the gratitude of civil society. How does this play out in ways that don't have to do strictly with money? The desire for them may not show up in the amount of money they make. Cops get rewarded for their aggression. When the cop slammed dude into the glass at BART. Prison guards, thought of as having the toughest beat on the planet. They get rewarded for being the last line of defense against George Jackson. Oscar Grant was an accumulation of aggression and phobias. Why are the black people in Prince George's County, Maryland, segregated from white people in their same socioeconomic bracket with the same kinds of high-value real estate, and the same kinds of political-economic values? Living around white people has a value that cannot be explained in strictly monetary terms. AFDC benefited mostly white single mothers, and enjoyed a long history of support from 1936-the 1960s. It initially excluded black people. By the 1960s, when black people started getting it, attitudes changed toward it, making it seem like it was undeserved and a drain on national prosperity, and by 1984, when Ronald Reagan referred to "welfare queens in Cadillacs," it was clear that AFDC was "a black thing." In actual statistical terms, it was still used mostly by white women. But once it became associated with poor black women, it was seen as in need of drastic, radical reforms. But is this "libidinal economy" really that important? Frank Wilderson is using the distinction between a money economy and an economy of desire over and over again throughout this book. Wilderson talks about this by talking about the difference between word and deed. This is not the hypocrisy of the system. It IS the logic of the system. So Europeans tried to resolve the lack of labor power by passing laws that reduced homeless white people to the status of slaves. In the end, however, they never really enforced these laws. Wilderson quotes David Eltis, an economic historian, who says that the costs of settling the "new world" would have been significantly reduced if Europeans has simply enslaved other Europeans. But, Wilderson points out, "what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the [symbolic value] which structures the libidinal economy of civil society." In other words, the symbolic costs of Europeans enslaving other Europeans would have been too great. Instead, they went to Africa for their slaves, even though the financial cost of doing so was much, much greater. The radical left doesn't make this distinction. Cornel West and Tavis Smiley say they want to organize a new Poor People's Campaign, but they won't be able to explain why this is a failed project from the start. This is because they won't think about the aspects of coalition building that have nothing to do with money or the lack of money. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called "Reagan Democrats" were poor and working-class white people, many of them in unions, who voted overwhelmingly for Reagan against their own economic interest. The white left mistakenly thinks about the Reagan Democrats as people who were duped. They view them as an example of what Marx called "false consciousness" and they see it as their duty to inform the white poor and working class of why they should vote left. But there were all kinds of signs that white poor and working-class folks simply hated black people and didn't want to live anywhere that there was a large community of black people, even if those black people are of the same or higher socioeconomic status. The Reagan Democrats were excited by Reagan's antiblack rhetoric of law and order, a rhetoric that was in response against the activities of the Black Liberation Army, Weather Underground, Black Panthers, and Black Guerilla Family. Marxists think a person is in a state of false consciousness if her political or social interests go another way than her material or financial interests. If you adopt this view, then you probably think that the Reagan Democrats just need to be educated correctly about what they have in common with the black poor and working class. You have to think that their hatred of black people is somehow "false" simply because it runs counter to their financial interests. But this would be to ignore their interest in maintaining white supremacy and antiblack racism. One of the things white men would lose would be access to black bodies for sexual pleasure and amusement. These examples are not just isolated cases of false consciousness, ignorance, media manipulation, or some mystical thing called "prejudice." They are all of those things, but they are also something much, much greater that any student of struggle needs to be aware of. These examples reveal the contours of an economy of desires that is not primarily concerned with money. It's not that the political economy isn't also antiblack. In fact, both economies are antiblack.

### Ag

**Embracing extinction as a narrative—not biological—phenomenon is a prerequisite to disrupting white desires**

**Schotten, 18**—Associate Professor of Political Science and an affiliated faculty in Women's and Gender Studies, University of Massachusetts-Boston (C. Heike, “SOCIETY MUST BE DESTROYED,” *Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony* pg 108-111, dml)

How, then, to articulate and effect the radical abolitionism of revolutionary desire without getting caught up in the stranglehold of futurism? Futurism’s inescapability means **not simply that politics is irredeemable** and **reform insufficient**, but also that the deconstructive or queer practice of **subversive redeployment** is a **naïve delusion** regarding our own ability to **think** and **act outside** or **beyond futurist mandates**. As Edelman simultaneously argues and demonstrates, futurism’s **stifling determination** of the very domain of the political itself means that **any** and **all resistance is always already coopted**, while revolt is an impossibly queered space that is simultaneously named and foreclosed by the death drive. Yet Edelman’s solution to this dilemma is to recommend neither **capitulation** to futurism nor some sort of **compromise** with it but rather an **accession to its worst nightmares** in an embrace of queerness that will **destroy it from within**, “shortcircuit[ing] the social in its present form.”74 In other words, rather than **defend** society, which Edelman finds indefensible, much less **deconstruct** society, as a queer critique of norms might recommend, or even (dear me!) **redeem** society, by **entreating a utopian vision** that imagines the overcoming of all suffering and oppression, Edelman instead declares we must **destroy society**. And we do so by **taking up**, **inhabiting**, or “**embracing**” the very “**death**” that futurism **inevitably produces** as the queer by- product of its social ordering. He thus **dismisses utopianism** in the name of an **immediacy** that “**the future stop here**,”75 challenging us to live life as an **insistent presentism** that will **do nothing else afterward but die**, and casting this alliance with death as the **act of revolutionary resistance**.

While Dean vociferously rejects this “embrace” because of its psychoanalytic impossibility, Edelman, I think, is well aware of this fact and recommends it precisely for this reason, a contradiction that becomes more intelligible if understood politically rather than solely psychoanalytically. Indeed, Edelman’s recommendation of this “embrace” is a clearly political position— despite what he may say otherwise— in two specific, complex ways. First, recall the historicization of Edelman’s argument provided in chapter 2, wherein I characterized his version of “politics” as a distinctly modern, European, settler colonial sovereignty. An important consequence of this historicization is that, even in his allegedly non- or antipolitical advocacy, Edelman **cannot actually be rejecting politics per se** since, despite his own claims to the contrary, there is **no such thing**. Abolishing modern politics or futurist politics is **not equivalent to abolishing politics as such** and could only mean as much if **every modernity were European modernity**, if **every politics were a sovereign biopolitics**, and if **every temporality were futurist**. To understand Edelman’s refusal of politics as a **refusal of any and all politics existing anywhere** is to **go along with** his unmarked **universalist presentation of** reproductive **futurism** as the **logic of everything existing everywhere all the time**, itself a frequent conceit of psychoanalytic frames.76 But if futurism is the **temporality of modern biopolitical sovereignty**, it **immediately becomes clear that other temporalities are possible**, even as other versions of politics **must necessarily exist**.77 As Audra Simpson argues, for example, “Indigenous political orders are quite simply, first, . . . **prior** to the project of founding, of settling, and as such **continue to point**, in their persistence and vigor, to the **failure of the settler project to eliminate them**, and yet are subjects of dispossession, of removal, but their polities serve as **alternative forms of legitimacy** and **sovereignties** to that of the settler state.”78

Historicizing futurist politics in this way means that alternative temporalities or political schemas **exist** but are queer(ed) and **represented as existential threats** to it: as **unintelligible**, **unlivable**, **immoral**, **backward**, and “**savage**.” While Edelman does indeed conflate all politics with futurism, such that his call for the destruction of politics seems to portend an unthinkable and intolerable nihilism, it is nevertheless the case that, once situated historically, the advocacy that queers **accede to the deathly positioning** to which they are always already relegated by reproductive futurism is **not some sort of unthinkable**, **antipolitical vision**, nor is it an **advocacy of suicide** or **some sort of necropolitical imperative**. Rather, in the context of a **European modernity** built on the colonization of most of the rest of the world, Edelman’s embrace of death can be read as a **prescription** for an **anticolonial allegiance to** and **alliance with those forms of politics** and **temporality that thwart**, **refuse**, or **deny futurism’s colonial mandates**. No Future’s embrace of the “death drive,” in other words, is a **championing of resistant futures** and **political systems** that **show up as death from a futurist perspective** and are various surrogates for the broad, structural category he designates as “queer.” In advocating for a revolution on behalf of queers and arguing for an embrace of queerness, then, Edelman is very much arguing in the name of something— not the future, of course, and certainly not life in any biological sense. But he is also **not quite arguing in the name of death in a biological sense**, either. Rather, he is arguing that “the dead” should “live,” that is, that they “come to life” (or insistently exist) and **animate the destruction of the settler order** that they are always already **consigned by that social order to symbolize**. This is, in other words, an argument for indigenous existence as resistance to settler sovereignty. Siting and situating futurism historically make clear that Edelman’s recommended accession to queerness/death is another name for radical resistance to sovereign biopolitics and that, **far from nihilism**, it is an **emancipatory** and **decolonizing political recommendation** of the first order. In this sense, even Edelman’s own project is wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes. As he says in recommendation of embracing the death drive, “political self- destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.”79 Edelman’s opposition to the political can therefore be reread as a **wholesale opposition** to the sovereign biopolitics of European modernity and an **imagining of the death of that political order** as the **content of revolutionary politics**. Indeed, his suggestion of a necessary “counterproject”80 to futurism makes clear that his recommendation of this refusal is the **essential**, **necessary**, and **definitive act of political resistance**, even as it is a **championing of the lives** and **political temporalities** of those **determined to be emissaries of death**.

Importantly, this destructive refusal is a threat that redounds back on Edelman himself and on **all of us who share** his **habitation of futurist politics** in Western modernity (or who were ourselves **trained in the history of that thought**). This is the second, complex way that Edelman’s rejection of politics is in fact a **maximally political entreaty**. The tension at work in Edelman’s inevitably futurist call to end futurism means that he is also and necessarily calling for the destruction of his own revolutionary project and subjective/authorial position. This is a queer revolution that **queers the aims of revolution itself**, divesting itself of futurism even as it speaks in its name. As a political act, it amounts “to **put[ting] one’s foot down at last**, **even if doing so costs us the ground on which we**, **like all others**, **must stand**.”81 It is a revolutionary desire that seeks to dispossess revolution of its failed foundations without thereby relinquishing either revolution or its animating desire. This revolutionary discourse exceeds the parameters of revolution as it has hitherto unfolded in modernity, even as it promises a liberation from modernity’s— and liberation’s— moralizing constraints.

This paradoxical, queer(ed) revolution is therefore **unmistakably tied to death**, and in more than one way: not only because queerness is the structural position of anything antisociety and antilife; not only because it **demands the destruction of all that has been construed as life** (as **valuable life**, as **worthy life**, as life **worth living** and **endowed with a future**); but also because the revolutionary call to destroy society and its futurist temporality will **necessarily result in the eradication of its own revolutionary demand in the process**. This is why Edelman’s queer political project **can never recommit us to sovereignty**, whether of a charismatic revolutionary leader, a vanguard revolutionary class, or a theological vision of an allpowerful monarch, much less the **sovereign subject**, whose **very European coherence requires futurism’s linear temporality**. It can commit us **only to the destruction of these things**, as well as to the **eradication of our own commitments precisely to that very destruction** if, as, and when they **threaten to become the next crushing futurist ideal**. Edelman’s formulation of the **impossible** yet **wholly revolutionary goal** of refusing futurism— a refusal achievable only in a future that lies beyond its textual articulation and summary rejection there— offers a **rich** and **provocative articulation** of a revolutionary desire that seeks to **dispossess revolution of its very foundations**, even as it speaks in its name.